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SOMETIMES  IT  IS hard to leave  well  enough alone.  During the first half 
of  the  1980s  U.S.  monetary  policy  was  the central actor at work in 
reducing the American economy's  ongoing  rate of price inflation from 
low  double  digits  to low  single  digits-and,  moreover,  doing  so at a 
real cost that was at most consistent  with existing  estimates of the cost 
of disinflation,  if not a little better. In the first half of the 1990s inflation 
slowed  further, again at a real cost  well  within the range of  standard 
"sacrifice  ratio"  calculations.  For well  over a year,  as of the time of 
writing, unemployment has been at or below the conventional 6 percent 
estimate  of  the  "nonaccelerating  inflation"  rate of  unemployment, 
while inflation itself,  after allowance  for the upward bias in the current 
consumer price index (as recently evaluated by the advisory commission 
established  by the Senate Finance Committee),  is within  1 percentage 
point of zero.  Yet despite  this impressive  track record of success  over 
a period now spanning a decade and a half, there is still no end to calls 
for fundamental reform of the way in which the Federal Reserve System 
goes  about making monetary policy. 
For practical purposes  the cutting edge  of this urge to redesign the 
U.S.  monetary  policymaking  framework  is  a bill,  currently pending 
before the U.S.  Senate,  that would formally establish the target of price 
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stability  as  the  Federal  Reserve's  sole  ongoing  policy  guideline.  In 
recent years several other countries have likewise  adopted either a price- 
stability  target or an inflation  target for their central bank,  including 
New Zealand (1990),  Canada (1991),  the United Kingdom (1992),  and 
Sweden  (1993).  In none of those countries,  however,  was the experi- 
ence  of  either inflation  or real growth in the years leading  up to this 
change as favorable as it has been lately in the United States. Moreover, 
the United  Kingdom  and Sweden  adopted their inflation targets in the 
wake  of  sizeable  currency  devaluations  as  they  withdraw  from  the 
European  exchange  rate  mechanism,  and earlier  on,  Germany  and 
Switzerland  adopted inflation targets in large part as a response to the 
breakdown of  the Bretton Woods  system.  By  contrast,  in the United 
States  the proposal  to  institute  a formal price  stability  target reflects 
less  a response  to a current problem (what is it?) than a generic desire 
to impose  constraints on the central bank. 
This desire is of long  standing and it has given  rise to an extremely 
rich literature of theoretical  analysis  as well  as empirical evaluation. ' 
A constant thread running throughout that literature is the crucial ten- 
sion  between  the  valid  objective  of  making  directly  responsible  to 
higher political  authority what is,  after all,  an essential  governmental 
function and the also valid objective  of leaving monetary policy  free to 
respond  as  appropriate to  unforeseen  contingencies:  in other words, 
rules  versus  discretion.  The heart of  the matter, as James Tobin  and 
others have long emphasized,  is that while in theory it may be possible 
to  design  a rule  that specifies  the  central bank's  response  under an 
extremely  wide variety of circumstances,  in practice the only effective 
rules in this context are simple rules.2 Giving up policymakers'  discre- 
tion is therefore likely  to be costly,  so that imposing  a policy  rule on a 
central bank is worthwhile only if doing so will avoid some even greater 
cost. 
Fifteen  years ago,  when high and rising inflation rates loomed  as a 
(in some cases,  the) major economic  issue in many industrialized coun- 
tries,  the  theory  of  time  inconsistency  plausibly  suggested  that this 
1.  See  Fischer  (1990)  for  a thorough  review.  For more recent  contributions,  see 
Debelle  and Fischer  (1994),  McCallum  (1995),  Walsh  (1995),  Posen  (1995),  and the 
references  cited by these authors. 
2.  Tobin  (1983).  This  principle  has attracted wide  agreement; see  also  Flood  and 
Isard (1989),  Taylor (1993),  Friedman (1993),  and McCallum (1995). Benjamin M.  Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  79 
inflation was a natural consequence  of a policymaking  framework that 
allowed  for discretionary  monetary policy,  so  that the gain  from re- 
stricting such discretion  by a policy  rule was potentially  large.  Today 
that claim  is  far less  persuasive.  Not  only  have  most  countries  suc- 
ceeded  in slowing  their economy's  inflation,  in most cases  they have 
done so under monetary policymaking  institutions no different than they 
had before.  The  United  States  is  an especially  good  example  in this 
regard. It is,  therefore,  ironic that a price stability target, which would 
directly  address the time  inconsistency  problem,  should be proposed 
just as time inconsistency  no longer appears to be a compelling  concern. 
The more general  point  is  the tendency,  which  may be inevitable, 
for policy  rules to fight the last war-or,  more accurately for purposes 
of monetary policy,  fight the same war on the terrain of the last battle- 
in the sense of preparing policy  to respond only to those contingencies 
that have actually  occurred in the fairly recent past,  rather than those 
that will  arise  in  the  future  when  the  rule  is  in  place.  To  be  sure, 
assessing  the potential  importance  of  different  kinds  of  disturbances 
when looking  backward is far less  problematic than when looking  for- 
ward. But that is precisely  the point. 
The object of this paper is to examine this tendency to impose policy 
rules  that amount  to  fighting  the  war on  the  last  battle's  terrain by 
studying  the most  recent effort  by the Congress  to impose  a form of 
working  rule on U.S.  monetary policy:  the injunction  to the Federal 
Reserve System,  under Concurrent Resolution  133, to formulate mon- 
etary policy  by  setting  explicit  targets  for  money  growth.  In brief, 
beginning  in 1975 the Congress required the Federal Reserve to estab- 
lish specific  numerical money growth targets, publicly  announce these 
targets in advance,  and report back to the Congress  on its success  or 
failure in achieving them. In 1979 the Federal Reserve publicly declared 
that it had intensified  its dedication  to controlling  money  growth and 
implemented new day-to-day operating procedures designed to enhance 
its ability to do so. In 1987 the Federal Reserve gave up setting a target 
for the narrow money stock (M 1) but continued to set targets for broader 
measures of money (M2 and M3). In 1993 the Federal Reserve publicly 
acknowledged  that it had "downgraded"  even its broad money growth 
targets-a  change  that most  observers  of  U.S.  monetary policy  had 
already noticed earlier on.  Since  1993 the Federal Reserve has contin- 
ued to report to the Congress  "ranges"  for broad money  growth (the 80  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Congress has never repealed Resolution  133, and so the requirement to 
do so remains the law of the land), but it scrupulously avoids designat- 
ing  these  ranges  as targets-or  even,  for that matter,  saying  what is 
their relevance  to monetary policy.3 
The  first  section  presents  evidence  documenting  that the  Federal 
Reserve  did-for  a while-genuinely  use its money growth targets to 
conduct  monetary  policy,  but eventually  came  to  ignore  the targets, 
even  though  the  legislation  calling  for  their use  remained  (and  still 
remains) in force.  The second  section  shows  that the abandonment of 
money growth targets was a sensible response on the Federal Reserve's 
part to the collapse  of prior empirical relationships between money and 
either output or prices.  The third section poses  the question why these 
empirical money-output and money-price relationships disintegrated as 
they  did,  suggesting  four different  hypotheses  with  sharply differing 
policy  implications.  The fourth section exploits  a more structured anal- 
ysis to test the three of these four hypotheses that cannot be immediately 
rejected  by  mere  inspection  of  the  relevant  data.  To  anticipate,  the 
evidence  points mostly  toward increased instability of money demand 
as  the  main  reason  why  observed  money  growth  lost  its  predictive 
content with respect to fluctuations of either output or prices, and there- 
fore why targeting money  growth became untenable as a way of con- 
ducting  monetary policy.  The  final section  uses  these  conclusions  to 
draw lessons  about the likely usefulness  of the current proposal to direct 
the Federal Reserve  to follow  a price stability target. 
The Use and Disuse of Money Growth Targets 
Observing what central banks do is usually straightforward.4 Estab- 
lishing  why they have done it is more problematic.  Central bank pur- 
chases  and sales  of  securities,  the resulting changes  in bank reserves, 
3.  In an amusing usage obviously designed to avoid the word target, the standard 
growth-cone  chart  in  the  semiannual  Monetary  Policy  Report  to  the  Congress  (the 
Humphrey-Hawkins  report)  now plots the "actual  range" and "actual  level" of M2 and 
M3. (What, one is tempted  to ask, is the meaning  of an actual range when the actual 
level falls outside it?) 
4.  This section and the next draw  in part  on Friedman  (1996). Benjamin  M. Friedman  and Kenneth  N. Kuttner  81 
and fluctuations  in the relevant  short-term interest rate are all known 
data not long after the fact.  But few central banks make clear just why 
they have chosen  thle actions they have taken. 
The usual critics notwithstanding,  the problem in this regard reflects 
more than a preference  for obfuscation.  Under institutional  arrange- 
ments  like  those  at the Federal Reserve  System,  where the key  deci- 
sionmaking  authority rests in a sizeable  committee  (the Federal Open 
Market Committee  [FOMC] has twelve voting members), different par- 
ticipants in the policy  process  may have different reasons for favoring 
the same action.  Requiring  them to agree not only  on what to do but 
also on a precise  statement of why they choose  to do it would  signifi- 
cantly raise the hurdle facing a policymaking  process that must play out 
in real time.  The situation is even more complicated  in that the Federal 
Reserve  is legally  responsible  to the Congress,  which historically  has 
been not only vague  and inconsistent  in stating its objectives  for mon- 
etary policy but also-as  subsequent sections of this paper argue-slow 
to alter its formal charges to the Federal Reserve  as economic  circum- 
stances have changed. 
Has the Federal Reserve  actually  attempted to implement its stated 
money growth targets? And if so,  how would one know? 
If there were never any disturbances to the relationships connecting 
money growth to prices and real economic  activity,  pursuing a money 
growth target would be empirically indistinguishable from simply vary- 
ing the interest rate or the quantity of reserves in order to come as close 
as possible  to achieving  the desired objectives  for prices and real activ- 
ity themselves.  Because  money growth does not covary precisely  with 
these  indicators  of  macroeconomic  performance,  however,  there is  a 
difference between a monetary policy that responds only to movements 
of prices and real activity  and a monetary policy  that, at least in part, 
targets money growth. 
The  approach  taken  here  to  infer  whether  the  Federal  Reserve's 
money growth targets have actually affected its monetary policy actions 
is to look for independent effects  of fluctuations in money,  relative to 
the stated growth target,  that are not already accounted  for by prices 
and real economic  activity.  In particular, John Taylor has  suggested 
that a simple formula relating the level of the federal funds rate to price 
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characterized  U.S.  monetary  policy  in  recent  years.5  The  approach 
taken here is to ask whether, and if so, when, the federal funds rate has 
also  responded to departures of money from the stated target. 
The  first row  of  table  1 presents  estimated  coefficient  values  and 
Newey-West  t statistics  for the regression 
(1)  rt  a  +  PITt-I  +  P2Tt-2  +  Y(U  U*)t-  l 
+  y2(U  -  U*)_-2  +  a(m  -  mT)t  +  ut, 
where r is the federal funds rate; uz  is the inflation rate measured over 
the preceding  twelve  months;6 U and U* are, respectively,  the unem- 
ployment rate and Robert Gordon's estimate of the corresponding "nat- 
ural"  rate (Taylor's  formula uses  instead the deviation  of real output 
from trend, but establishing  the appropriate output trend is problematic 
over as long a time period as is ultimately treated here);7 m and mT are, 
respectively,  the actual Ml  money  stock and the midpoint of the cor- 
responding  target range (both in logarithms);8 and u is  a disturbance 
term. For each year' s observations,  both m and mT  refer to the definition 
of MI  in use in that year, and the data used for m and used to construct 
mT are taken from unpublished  Federal Reserve  sources  dated shortly 
after the  year's  end.9 (For purposes  of  this exercise  it is essential  to 
estimate the regression using data that correspond to what policymakers 
saw  and construed  as  MI  at the  time,  rather than the  standard data 
5.  See Taylor  (1993). Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992), among  others,  have argued  that 
the federal  funds rate  is the best single measure  of monetary  policy in the United  States. 
6.  The price index used here is core CPI-U;  that  is, the consumer  price index for all 
urban  consumers,  excluding food and energy items. The twelve-month  inflation  rate is 
calculated  as  ,  _l=  Pt-  i  -  P,  -13  and  , - 2  =  Pt -  2  -  P,  - 147  where  p is the logarithm 
of the price index. 
7.  The unemployment  rate is the rate for the civilian labor  force aged sixteen and 
over. The natural  rate is from Gordon  (1993, table A-2), rendered  into monthly  values 
and continued at 6.0  percent after 1992. (Gordon's series ends in  1992:2, but it is 
constant  at 6.0 percent  throughout  1980-92.) 
8.  Friedman  (1996) also experiments  with an alternative  representation  that distin- 
guishes discontinuously  between values of money that  are within  and outside the target 
range  by  setting  (m  -  mi7)  equal  to  zero  whenever  observed  money  is  within  the 
corresponding  range and for observations  outside the range, equal to the algebraic 
difference between  m  and the monthly  path traced  by either  the upper  or lower end of 
the target range, whichever is closer. The results are very close to those found here 
using the continuous  representation  based  on the midpoint. 
9.  We are grateful  to Donald Kohn and Richard  Porter  for providing  historical  data 
on the designated  target  ranges  and the contemporaneous  estimates  of the money  stock. w~~~~~C  rl  Oti  tti  C>  O  x  -  t-  0  oE,C 
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available  today,  which  incorporate subsequent revisions  and changed 
definitions.)  All  variables  included  in  the  regression  are measured 
monthly,  beginning  in January 1960,  and all are in units corresponding 
to percent. 
Following  the passage of Resolution  133, the Federal Reserve's  first 
formally  stated money  growth targets specified  growth ranges for the 
Ml , M2, and M3 aggregates over the one-year period from March 1975 
to March 1976.  April  1975 was therefore the first month for which the 
actual value of any given  measure of money could be compared to the 
value implied by the corresponding growth target (and with a one-month 
observation  lag,  May  1975  was  the  first month  in which  success  or 
failure in achieving  its money growth target could plausibly have influ- 
enced  the  Federal  Reserve's  setting  of  the  federal  funds  rate).  For 
purposes  of  the regression,  therefore,  (m  -  mT)  simply  assumes  the 
value zero for all months in the sample through March 1975.  For April 
through June 1975,  mT is defined by tracing out for those three months 
the growth path implied by the 6.25  percent per year midpoint of the 5 
to 7.5  percent M1 growth target specified  for the period running from 
the first quarter of  1975 to the corresponding quarter of  1976. 
In June 1975 the Federal Reserve moved forward the base from which 
it was targeting the monetary aggregates and also shifted to a quarterly 
computation  basis,  so that the new targets specified  growth ranges for 
the period  1975:2  to  1976:2.  For purposes of the monthly regression, 
therefore,  mT  for July through September 1975 is defined by the monthly 
values  along the path implied by the midpoint of this new M1 growth 
target  (again  5  to  7.5  percent  per year,  but from the  1975:2  base). 
Similarly,  mT for October through December  1975 is defined from the 
midpoint  of  the next  new target for MI  growth,  set in September for 
the period 1975:3-1976:3  (yet again 5 to 7.5 percent per year, but now 
from  the  1975:3  base).  For January  1976  through December  1978, 
values of mT are similarly defined from the successive  midpoints of the 
rolling  annual  growth  targets  that the  Federal  Reserve  continued  to 
establish  for MI  on a quarterly basis. 
Beginning  from  1979 the Federal Reserve  shifted to annual money 
growth targets,  in each case  based from the fourth quarter of the pre- 
vious  year,  with the possibility  of changing the target at midyear.  For 
January 1979  through December  1986,  therefore,  mT  is defined  from 
the midpoints of these successive  annual target ranges for M1 (in some Benjamin M.  Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  85 
years called  "monitoring  ranges"),  as amended during the year in both 
1983  and  1985.10  The  Federal  Reserve  has  not  designated  a formal 
growth target for MI  since  1986,  and so  the regression  sample  ends 
with December  1986. 
The estimates  for equation  1 shown  in the first row of  table  1 are 
roughly consistent  with standard interpretations of monetary policy be- 
havior,  including  Taylor's.  Faster inflation leads the Federal Reserve 
to set a higher interest rate, although the specific combination of P, and 
2  values  suggests  a response  both to  inflation  and to  the change  in 
inflation.  Similarly,  the combination  of  y,  and Y2  values  suggests  that 
an increase  in unemployment  (relative  to the  "natural"  rate),  rather 
than a greater level,  leads to a lower interest rate. 
More  important for  purposes  of  this  paper,  the coefficient  on  the 
money gap variable (m  -  mT)  does suggest-albeit  with only marginal 
statistical  s\gnxftcance-an  independent  response by  tlhe Federal Re- 
serve to movements of MI growth in relation to the corresponding target 
path. Specifically,  a level  of MI  that is  1 percent above the midpoint 
of  the  target range  leads,  on  average  over  the entire  time  when  the 
Federal Reserve was setting Ml  growth targets (May  1975 through De- 
cember 1986), to a federal funds rate 50 basis points higher than prevailing 
levels of inflation and unemployment would otherwise warrant. 
To be sure, evidence  of this form does not distinguish between mon- 
etary policy  responses  that genuinely  target money-in  the strict sense 
that once observed  money has departed from the designated range, the 
proximate objective  of policy  is taken to be getting  the actual money 
stock back within range-and  policy responses that merely exploit var- 
iations of observed  money relative to the designated range as an infor- 
mation variable. " (Similarly,  a significant coefficient on unemployment 
would not necessarily  constitute evidence  that preferences with respect 
10.  For  1980  and  1981  the  Federal  Reserve  established  separate targets for what 
were  then  called  MI-A  and  MI-B.  For those  two  years  the  regression  relies  on  the 
MI-B  aggregate,  which,  as of  1982,  was simply  relabeled Ml. 
11.  On the distinction  between  an intermediate target variable and an information 
variable,  see,  for example,  Friedman (1993).  One way to draw this distinction  empiri- 
cally would be to include the Federal Reserve's  forecasts of inflation and unemployment 
in the regression.  McNees  ( 1992) carries out an analysis of this kind, albeit for a different 
specification  of the reaction function  than that used here,  and finds evidence  indicating 
that the Federal Reserve  did treat MI  growth as an independent target variable,  not just 
as an information variable. 86  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1.1996 
to  unemployment  per  se  were  guiding  monetary  policy;  even  if  the 
Federal Reserve  had been  solely  seeking  to control inflation,  it might 
have varied the federal funds rate in response to observed fluctuations 
of unemployment  if those  observations  helped to predict future infla- 
tion.)  Under either  interpretation,  however,  evidence  of  a direct,  in- 
dependent response to (m -  mT)  represents a reliance on money growth 
targets that clearly differs from the kind of behavior posited by Taylor 
for more recent years. 
Not surprisingly,  the estimates  for equation  1 shown in the first row 
of table 1 suffer from severe serial correlation (hence the use of Newey- 
West  t statistics).  The  Federal  Reserve's  well-known  preference  for 
smoothing  interest rates makes the policy  response to any independent 
variables like those included here-money  growth, too-equivalent  to 
a partial adjustment process.  The second  row of the table reports the 
results of reestimating equation  1 with twelve  lags of the federal funds 
rate also  included  as  independent  variables,  and the annualized  one- 
month inflation rate substituted for the twelve-month rate. (Preliminary 
investigation  indicated that eliminating  all significant first-order serial 
correlation  requires at least  eleven  lags.)  Given  these  lagged  interest 
rate terms,  the  coefficients  on  inflation  become  smaller  and lose  all 
statistical  significance.  By contrast, the coefficients  on the unemploy- 
ment terms become  distinctly more significant.  The estimated long-run 
response of the federal funds rate to observed Ml  that remains perma- 
nently  1 percent above  the target midpoint is 500 basis points  [0.085/ 
(1  -  0.983)]. 
There is no reason,  however,  to assume that the Federal Reserve's 
behavior with respect to its Ml  growth target remained unchanged over 
the nearly twelve-year  period during which  it formulated a target for 
the  narrow money  aggregate.'2  Most  obvious,  the Federal Reserve's 
own official  statements,  as well  as the widespread opinion  among ob- 
servers of U.S.  monetary policy,  indicated that money growth targets 
played an especially  important role in the policymaking  process  during 
the  three-year  period  beginning  in  October  1979.  As  a test  of  this 
proposition,  the third and fourth rows of table 1 present estimates (with 
12.  There is also ground for supposing  that the response to inflation and unemploy- 
ment changed over time (see,  for example,  the evidence  presented in Friedman,  1996), 
but that is not the focus  of attention in this paper. Benjamin M. Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  87 
and without twelve  lags of the dependent variable, respectively)  for the 
expanded regression 
rt  =  a+  ,1r3It  +  127Tt-2  +  'Y(U-  U-t)_ 
(2)  +  -y2(U  -  U*),-2  +  8(m  -M')t_ 
+  0[(m  -  mT),,  x  D,]  +  ut, 
where D  is  a dummy  variable  equal  to one  in each  of  the thirty-six 
months spanning October  1979 through September  1982 and equal to 
zero  both  before  and  after,  so  that the  regression  distinguishes  the 
Federal Reserve's  attempt to target Ml  growth during the "monetarist 
experiment"  of the early  1980s from that at other times. 
The results  of  estimating  equation  2 do support the claim  that the 
Federal Reserve placed much greater emphasis on its MI  target during 
the 1979-82  episode.  The regression without lags indicates an interest 
rate response of  148 basis points (0.295  +  1.185)  to a 1 percent move- 
ment of MI  away from the target midpoint during 1979-82,  and only 
30  basis  points  at other  times.  The  larger estimate  is  significant  at 
standard levels  (the t statistic for the sum of 8 and 0 is 2.7),  while the 
smaller is not. The regression with lags indicates a corresponding long- 
run response  of  1182 basis  points  [(0.041  +  0.349)/(1  -  0.967)]- 
which  seems  too  large to be entirely  credible-during  1979-82,  and 
124 basis  points  at other times.  (Here the t statistic  for the sum of  8 
and 0 is 3.0.) 
Figure  1 shows the result of yet a finer attempt to explore the chang- 
ing importance of  the MI  growth target for U.S.  monetary policy  by 
estimating equation  1, again including twelve  lags on the federal funds 
rate, using an explicit  time-varying-parameter model for the coefficient 
6.  The upper panel displays  the time  series  of recursively  updated 8, 
estimates computed from the Kalman filter, in which any given month's 
estimate  of  8  relies  on  data only  through that month,  and therefore 
corresponds  to the behavior  of  monetary policy  as observers  at each 
point  in  time  could  have  assessed  it.'3  The  lower  panel  displays 
13.  The model  replaces  the time-invariant  8  coefficient  in equation  1 with  a time- 
varying  8,,  which  is  assumed  to  follow  a random walk,  8,  =  8, -  +  E,.  The  other 
coefficients  are not allowed  to vary over time.  The initial conditions  for the coefficients 
other than 8  were taken from the ordinary least squares regression  of the federal funds 
rate on  the  variables  other  than  (m  -  mi')  over  the  subsample  from  February  1960 88  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1996 
Figure  1. Coefficient  on Money Deviation  Term in Monetary  Policy Reaction 
Function  with Mla 
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the equivalent time  series  of  8, estimates  computed from the Kalman 
smoother,  which  uses  data  from  the  entire  sample  to  construct  the 
retrospective minimum mean square error estimate of each month's 8,. 
The filtered estimates  provide  no evidence  that the money  growth 
target actually mattered for Federal Reserve policy in the first two years 
or so following  the adoption of Resolution  133. The estimated coeffi- 
cient on (m  -  mT)  begins to rise modestly  in late 1977,  but it does not 
become  consistently  significant  until early  1980,  when  it rises  much 
more sharply. It declines  sharply in mid-1982,  but remains significant. 
It begins to decline  again in early 1985 and continues to do so, ceasing 
to be significant  some time in  1986.'4 
The smoothed estimates  tell much the same story. From its peak in 
late  1980  the  coefficient  on  (m  -  MT)  declines  steadily,  and it has 
become statistically  insignificant by mid-1984.  Only for the late 1970s 
do the two  sets  of  time-varying-parameter  estimates  present differing 
views  of  monetary  policy,  in that the  smoothed  estimates  indicate  a 
positive  influence  on  the  federal  funds  rate due  to  the  gap  between 
observed money  and the target range midpoint.  In part, however,  this 
apparent difference  merely  reflects  the  imprecision  of  the  estimated 
coefficient  in the early part of the sample. 
One potential source of concern about results like those presented in 
table 1 or figure 1 is the consistent  use of the federal funds rate as the 
dependent  variable  that represents the direct operating instrument of 
monetary policy.  While  there is substantial agreement that the federal 
funds rate was,  indeed,  the relevant policy  instrument both before and 
after the experiment of 1979-82,  during this period the Federal Reserve 
stated that it was using  a different operating procedure that, in effect, 
made the growth of nonborrowed reserves the central bank's instrument 
variable. '5  To  verify  that the  results  presented  in  table  1 are not  a 
through April  1974.  The starting value of  8  was set to zero,  with variance 0.25.  Other 
plausible starting values  yielded  virtually indistinguishable  results. The standard devia- 
tion  of  the  shock  to  the  8, coefficient,  u,,,  was  set  to  0.01.  (In principle,  maximum 
likelihood estimation  of u,, is feasible,  but the results were very similar for a wide range 
of assumed values  of  oJ-.) 
14.  These  results  are very  similar to those  presented by Friedman (1996)  using  an 
expanding-  or  rolling-sample  regression  model  with  dummy  variables  that mimics  a 
time-varying-parameter  model  in a step-wise  fashion. 
15.  For a description  of  the nonborrowed reserves  procedure,  see  Board of Gover- 
nors of the Federal Reserve  System  (1981).  Subsequent  research has mostly  supported 90  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1.1996 
consequence  of using an incorrect dependent variable in the regression 
during the period when money growth targets apparently mattered most, 
the first two rows of table 2 show the results of estimating equations  1 
and 2  with  the  annualized  growth  of  nonborrowed reserves  plus  ex- 
tended  credit  as  the  dependent  variable.  (The  estimated  regressions 
include no lagged  dependent variables because there is no evidence  of 
serial correlation.) 
The  positive  coefficient  on  (m  -  mT) reported in the first row  of 
table 2 for the entire period during which the Federal Reserve  formu- 
lated Ml  growth targets is consistent  with the implication  of the use, 
over most of that time,  of an operating procedure based on the federal 
funds rate as the direct instrument variable.  For a given  interest rate 
level,  a greater level  of money (relative to target) means more reserves 
to be provided through open market operations.  By contrast, when the 
dummy  variable distinguishes  the period from October  1979 through 
September  1982  from  the  periods  before  and after,  the  different  re- 
sponse of nonborrowed reserves to (m  -  mT) is clearly evident.  When 
the Federal Reserve  was using  nonborrowed reserves  as its operating 
instrument,  reserves  growth responded  negatively  to observed  devia- 
tions of money  from the target midpoint. 
The  lower  rows  of  tables  1 and 2,  and figure  2,  present  similar 
analyses  for the Federal Reserve's  M2 target-but  extending  through 
the end  of  1995.  The  results  are roughly  in line  with those  reported 
above for M1,  although in the case of M2 the coefficient  estimates  are 
generally  less  significant.  In the time-varying-parameter model,  how- 
ever,  the response  to (m  -  mT)  is again clearly  significant from mid- 
1980  through late  1986.  Thereafter the estimated  coefficient  remains 
positive,  but it is never again statistically  significant. 
In sum,  the evidence  is  clear that the Federal Reserve  did-for  a 
while-target  money,  in the sense that it varied either the federal funds 
rate or nonborrowed reserves  (whichever  was its operating instrument 
at the time)  in response  to observed  fluctuations of  either Ml  or M2 
that departed from the corresponding  stated targets. The failure to do 
so in the first few years after the Congress adopted Resolution  133 can 
perhaps be explained away as a delayed, or cautiously gradual, response 
the claim that during this period the instrument variable was nonborrowed reserves; see, 
for example,  Bernanke and Mihov  (1995). rq  -  -0 
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Figure 2. Coefficient  on Money  Deviation  Term  in Monetary  Policy Reaction 
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to the new  legislation.  What is more interesting,  for purposes of this 
paper, is the effective  abandonment of the money growth targets in the 
mid-1980s,  when the pertinent legislation  remained in force (as it does 
today). 
Why has the Federal Reserve come to disregard the instruction given 
to it by the Congress,  to which the central bank is directly responsible? 
To  answer  this  question  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  relationship 
between money and the objectives that monetary policy seeks to achieve 
in the first place. 
The Changing Information Content of Money 
The  standard rationale  for  using  a money  growth  target to  guide 
monetary policy  is that, under the right conditions,  doing so provides 
a coherent  way  of  taking into account unforeseen  developments.  The 
opportunity  to  exploit  a variable  like  money  for  this  purpose  arises 
because  the actions of central banks and their economic  consequences 
are separated both by time and by behavioral process: A change in the 
interest rate (or the quantity of  reserves)  effects  a difference  in eco- 
nomic  activity  later on,  and the economic  behavior that gives  rise to 
that difference involves  actions that are, at least in principle, observable 
along the way.  In principle,  money growth is an observable element of 
that intermediate behavior  standing between  central bank actions  and 
their ultimate economic  consequences. 
Given  that the central bank's  main form of monetary policy  action 
in a fractional reserve banking system  is the purchase or sale of secu- 
rities  in exchange  for bank reserves,  most familiar models  of the be- 
havioral process connecting  monetary policy to economic  activity plau- 
sibly provide at least a potential role for fluctuations in some measure 
of  money  to anticipate  movements  in prices,  real output,  or both.  In 
the most conventional  models,  open market purchases provide reserves 
that enable  banks  to  create  more deposits,  thereby reducing  interest 
rates (as long as the demand for deposits  is negatively  interest elastic) 
and stimulating  spending.  A closely  related alternative focuses  on the 
importance of bank lending in the financing of either business or house- 
hold  expenditures,  so  that movements  in  money  anticipate  spending 
primarily because  they reflect what is happening on the credit side of 94  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
the banking system's  balance sheet. Yet a different view focuses  on the 
presumed link between  money  and prices,  so that any effects  on real 
activity arise as a consequence  of the output decisions of producers who 
are unsure of  how  to interpret the limited  information they receive  as 
prices change. 
In each of these models,  however,  the behavior that ultimately gen- 
erates  changes  in prices  or real activity  also  involves  movements  of 
money.  To  the extent  that these  movements  in money  occur not just 
logically  but chronologically  before  the corresponding  movements  in 
prices  or output,  the central bank can-again,  under the right condi- 
tions-exploit  them to  make whatever  changes  in its  interest rate or 
reserves  instrument unforeseen  events  may warrant. Strictly  defined, 
the use of a money  growth target means that the central bank not only 
treats all  unexpected  fluctuations  in money  as providing  information 
about as yet unobserved  fluctuations in prices or output, but also,  as a 
quantitative matter, responds to such aberrant movements of money by 
changing  its  instrument  variable  in  such  a way  as to  restore  money 
growth to the originally designated path. Alternatively,  the central bank 
could  incorporate money  growth into its monetary policyrnaking pro- 
cess  in a more flexible  way,  recognizing  that movements  in money are 
not always a sign of movements in prices and output to come,  and hence 
deciding  on a case  by case  basis whether,  and if so by how much,  to 
move  its  instrument  variable  when  observed  money  growth  behaves 
unexpectedly.  Doing so amounts to using money growth not as a target, 
but as an information variable. 
But regardless  of  whether the central bank makes money  growth a 
formal  target or uses  it as an information variable,  the whole  idea is 
senseless  unless  observed  fluctuations  in money  do anticipate  move- 
ments of prices,  or output, or whatever constitutes  the ultimate objec- 
tive of monetary policy.  What would it mean to exploit  an information 
variable  that contained  no  relevant  information? What would  be  the 
point in pursuing an intermediate target that was not observably  inter- 
mediate  between  the  central  bank's  actions  and the  intended  conse- 
quences? In either case,  whether movements in money anticipate move- 
ments  in prices,  or output,  or both,  is  crucial.'6  That,  in turn, is  an 
16.  What  matters  for  this  purpose  is  merely  that  movements  in  money  precede 
movements  in prices or output. It is not necessary that money play any part in "causing" Benjamin M.  Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  95 
empirical  question.  Moreover,  because  economic  circumstances 
change,  the answer at one point in time need not be the same as at a 
later point. 
Figure  3  addresses  this  issue  by  showing,  for each  of  a series  of 
eighty-one  overlapping  sample periods,  the contribution of  money  to 
subsequent  movements  in real output (top panel)  and prices  (bottom 
panel) as estimated by means of the standard unrestricted vector auto- 
regression  (VAR)  methodology.  For each of  the eighty-one  samples, 
the  figure  indicates  the  respective  percentages  of  output  and prices 
accounted for by money at a two-year horizon. 17 Each such percentage 
is  the  product  of  a  variance  decomposition  based  on  an underlying 
quarterly four-variable vector autoregression,  including real gross do- 
mestic  product,  the corresponding  price deflator,  and the MI  money 
stock  (all  in logarithms  and all  seasonally  adjusted),  and the federal 
funds rate (not seasonally  adjusted),  with four lags  on each  variable. 
The orthogonalization  of this  system  for purposes of the variance de- 
composition  places  output first,  prices  second,  money  third,  and the 
interest  rate fourth.  In each  panel  the  solid  line  plots  the  estimated 
contribution of  money  to either output or prices,  as estimated  over  a 
sample ending at the date denoted on the horizontal axis,  while the pair 
of  dashed  lines  indicates  the  one-standard-error band of  uncertainty 
associated  with this estimate. 
The initial percentage  plotted in each panel of figure 3 refers to the 
variance decomposition  based on the four-variable vector  autoregres- 
sion estimated  using  data beginning  in  1959:1  and ending  in  1974:4. 
(Because  of the four lags on each variable, the regression's  first obser- 
vation is 1960:1,  and so this initial sample includes sixty observations.) 
The two  initial  percentages  therefore indicate how  someone  applying 
this methodology  in early  1975 would  have assessed  the contribution 
of the MI  money  stock to predicting that part of the subsequent fluc- 
tuation of  output  and prices  that is  not already predictable  from the 
prior fluctuation of output and prices themselves.  18 
movements  in prices  or output,  in the  classical  sense.  The  discussion  below  follows 
Tobin  (1970)  in emphasizing  this distinction.  In particular, the use of the vector auto- 
regression  methodology  merely  determines  whether money  has predictive  content  for 
such movements,  not whether money  is causal. 
17.  The results are very similar for a one-year horizon; see Friedman (1996). 
18.  To show  more precisely  how someone  in early  1975 would have answered this 96  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
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The  answer,  as of  1975,  is that knowing  the recent movements  of 
MI  contributes fairly little to predicting output, but modestly  more to 
predicting prices.  '9 At the two-year-ahead horizon considered in figure 
3,  money  accounts  for about 6 percent of the subsequent variation in 
output, but over  14 percent of the variation in prices.  The output per- 
centage  is not significantly  different from zero even  at the weak level 
reflected by the one-standard-error band. The percentage for prices is 
barely significant  at this level. 
The other eighty points plotted in each panel of figure 3 indicate the 
results of analogous  variance decompositions  based on sample periods 
ending in  1975:1,  1975:2,  and so on through 1994:4.  In each case the 
question at issue  is the same-how  much M1 contributes to predicting 
that part of the subsequent fluctuation of output and prices not already 
predictable from prior output and prices-but  the vantage point from 
which the question is asked continually  moves  forward in time.  As the 
end  date  of  the  sample  advances  from  1974:4  to  1979:4,  the  initial 
observation  remains  1960:1,  so that the sample size  expands (one ob- 
servation  at a time)  from  sixty  to eighty  quarters. Thereafter the end 
date and the beginning  date advance together,  so that the sample size 
remains eighty  quarters. 
The estimates change substantially as the end of the sample advances 
from  1975 to  1995.  The contribution of MI  to explaining  subsequent 
output fluctuations initially  briefly increased somewhat,  but mostly re- 
mained small until the early 1980s. It then increased sharply (and briefly 
became  significant  at conventional  levels),  but since  the mid-1980s  it 
has mostly declined  and has remained clearly insignificant at any inter- 
esting  level.20 The contribution of MI  to explaining  subsequent price 
question  would  require using  data that existed  then-not,  as here,  the revised  data for 
1959-74  that exist  now.  The work reported in the first section of this paper follows  that 
approach. By contrast, in this and following  sections the emphasis is on how the relevant 
economic  behavior has changed  over time,  and so the results reported rely on the latest 
revised data available  as of the time of writing. 
19.  Moreover,  ordering money  ahead of the interest rate for purposes of the ortho- 
gonalization  biases  the results shown here in favor  of a predictive content for money. 
20.  Because  of the rolling-sample  procedure,  the odd spike at 1981:2 in the output 
panel of figure 3 (and,  to a lesser  extent,  in the price panel) could  in principle be due 
either to sequentially  adding  1981:2  and then  1981:3 to the sample,  or to sequentially 
dropping  1961:2 and then  1961:3.  Experimentation shows  that what matters is sequen- 
tially adding the new observations.  When the underlying vector autoregression  is run on 98  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
fluctuations increased rapidly in both magnitude and statistical signifi- 
cance at first, only  to decline  equally  rapidly and lose  all significance 
in the early  1980s.  It has since become  negligible. 
An alternative way of addressing the contribution of money to pre- 
dicting the subsequent variation of output or prices is to test explicitly 
the hypothesis  that money has no such predictive power at all. In prin- 
ciple,  the  eighty-one  vector  autoregressions  underlying  the  variance 
decompositions  reported in figure 3 readily admit such a test.  Because 
each of the four included variables (the respective  log levels  of output, 
prices,  and  money,  and the  nominal  interest  rate)  is  nonstationary, 
however,  standard test statistics based on the normal distribution would 
be inappropriate for these  regressions.  Moreover,  the distributions of 
the appropriate test statistics are known only for certain special cases.2' 
The two panels of figure 4 therefore plot p values for tests of the null 
hypothesis  that all coefficients  8,  or 8,,i are zero in the two differenced 
equations 
4  4 
Axt  Or +  E  f3,xt_i  +  XY  APt-i 
(3) 
4  4 
+  E  8,6m,t1  +  E  O4rt_  +  ut 
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4  4 
AP=  tO/p  +  E  rpAxt-i  +  X  Yp)iAp,-i 
(4) 
4  4 
+  E  pjlXmt_j  +  E  Op,AXrt_  +  v_,  (4)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
differenced  data,  the  same  general  pattern appears,  but  these  spikes  are  much  less 
pronounced. 
21.  See  the discussion  in Sims,  Stock,  and Watson (1990).  As  these  authors point 
out,  the  "levels"  regression  used  above  for purposes  of  the variance decompositions 
preserves any cointegrating  relationships  that obtain among the included variables with- 
out  explicitly  imposing  those  relationships.  One  potential  cost  of  using  differenced 
relationships  like equations  3 and 4 below  is that they do not incorporate the long-run 
relationships  implied  by cointegration.  Evidence  for the existence  of  cointegration  in 
this  context  is  weak,  however;  see,  for  example,  Friedman  and Kuttner (1992)  and 
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Figure  4.  Significance  of Ml  in Predicting  Output  and the Price  Level, 
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where x,  p,  and m are, respectively,  the logarithms of  real gross  do- 
mestic  product,  the price  deflator,  and the MI  money  stock;  r is the 
federal funds rate; u and v are disturbance terms; and ox  and Pi,  y,, 6,, 
and O0  in each equation are all coefficients  to be estimated.  In parallel 
with figure 3,  the first p  value  plotted  in each panel of  figure 4 gives 
the result of  testing  the null  hypothesis  of  zero predictive  content  of 
money  over  the  sample  ending  in  1974:4,  and the subsequent  eighty 
values refer to the samples ending in 1975: 1,  1975:2, and so on through 
1994:4.  The  dashed horizontal  lines  in each panel  indicate  the 0.01, 
0.05,  and 0. 10 significance  levels. 
The  results  generated  by  this  more  explicit  hypothesis  test  differ 
conceptually  from the variance decomposition  results shown in figure 
3 for several reasons.  Most basically,  asking the yes-or-no  question of 
whether  money  has  any  predictive  content  with  respect  to  output or 
prices  is not the same  as asking  how much predictive  content money 
has.  In addition,  the significance  test  based on the regression  coeffi- 
cients refers (by construction) to a one-quarter-ahead prediction,  while 
the variance  decompositions  reported above  refer to an eight-quarter 
horizon.  Finally,  levels  are not the same as growth rates, although it is 
impossible  to evaluate the force of this distinction because of the non- 
stationarity problem. 
Given all of these differences  of method,  it is not surprising that the 
p  values  shown  in  figure  4  do  not  fully  correspond  to  the  variance 
decomposition  results  in  figure 3.  Here,  money  never has predictive 
power with respect to output that is significant,  even at the 0. 10 level, 
as seen from any of the eighty-one  vantage points spanning the twenty 
22 
years.2  Money has significant predictive content with respect to prices 
when judged  from any vantage point through early  1983.  During most 
of  this  early  period,  this  predictive  content  is  significant  at the 0.05 
level,  and for a brief period it is significant at the 0.01  level.  From no 
vantage point since  1983,  however,  is there any evidence  of predictive 
content with respect to prices,  even at the 0. 10 level. 
Figures  5  and 6 present evidence  for M2  that is  analogous  to that 
22.  Stock and Watson (1989),  among others,  argued that also including a time trend 
in the regression restored the predictive content of M 1 with respect to output in this kind 
of regression,  but Friedman and Kuttner (1993)  show that this result depends on the use 
of a specific  interest rate. Stock and Watson's  result also disappears when the sample is 
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Figure  5. Contribution  of M2 to Output  and Price  Variancea 
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Figure  6. Significance  of M2 in Predicting  Output  and the Price Levela 
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presented for M1 in figures 3 and 4,  respectively.  In figure 5 the per- 
centage  of the subsequent variation of output explained  by M2 is con- 
sistently  significant  (by  the  weak  criterion  of  the one-standard-error 
band)  as  seen  from all  vantage  points  from  1977 through  1989,  and 
again (surprisingly) after 1991 -although  then the estimated percentage 
is  generally  smaller.  By  contrast,  M2  accounts  for only  a small  and 
insignificant  percentage of the subsequent variation of prices  through- 
out.  As  figure  6  shows,  however,  with  the  exception  of  a  solitary 
vantage  point  at the end of  1975,  the predictive  content  of  M2  with 
respect to output as measured directly from the differenced  autoregres- 
sion is never significant,  even  at the 0. 10 level,  and the directly mea- 
sured predictive  content of M2 with respect to prices  is never signifi- 
cant, even  at the 0. 10 level. 
Whether money does or does not have predictive content with respect 
to output or prices  is essential  to assessing  whether the use of  money 
growth targets,  or even  the use of  money  as an information variable, 
constitutes  a potentially  effective  strategy  under which  to  carry out 
monetary policy.  Policymakers  need not have been tracking estimated 
relationships  of  exactly  the  same form as those  reported in figures 3 
and 4 for M1 and figures 5 and 6 for M2,  but to the extent that these 
results,  based  as they  are on  data only  up through specific  points  in 
time,  provide an indication of whether money did or did not have such 
predictive content, that kind of evidence-or  lack of it-at  least should 
have been an important factor in the central bank's choice  of monetary 
policy  strategy. 
For the most part, the Federal Reserve  System's  use and disuse  of 
money growth targets as guidelines  for U.S.  monetary policy  over the 
past twenty  years  appears to have been roughly  consistent  with what 
this changing evidence  on money-output and money-price relationships 
has warranted. The evidence  presented in the first section of this paper 
suggests that, with some notable exceptions,  money growth targets have 
been a visible  influence  on U.S.  monetary policy  actions  primarily at 
times when at least some forms of evidence  (although certainly not all) 
on these money-output and money-price relationships have appeared to 
justify  it.  More  obvious,  the  Federal  Reserve's  turning  away  from 
money  growth targets has been entirely  consistent  with what the evi- 
dence  on  these  changing  relationships  has  warranted.23 The  Federal 
23.  See  Friedman  (1996)  for  a detailed  evaluation  of  changes  in the  Federal  Re- 104  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Reserve's  actions  in this regard  -are aptly summarized by former Bank 
of  Canada governor  John Crow's  often  quoted description  of the Ca- 
nadian experience:  "We  didn't abandon the monetary aggregates; they 
abandoned us." 
Why Did Money Lose Its Predictive Content? 
Whether or not U.S.  monetary policymakers  were right to respond 
to the change in the observed relationship of money to output and prices 
by deemphasizing  their money growth targets, for purposes of this paper 
the more pertinent question  is why these key relationships  changed as 
they did. Four potential explanations-more  seriously,  only three-are 
familiar from long-standing  discussions  centering on these issues. 
HYPOTHESIS  0:  STABLE  MONEY  GROWTH.  The  most  obvious  reason 
why  fluctuations  in money  could  in principle  have  ceased  to predict 
subsequent  movements  in either output or prices  is that money  itself 
(or its growth rate) could have ceased to fluctuate. Traditional advocates 
of  stable  money  growth  rules  have  always  maintained that the  ideal 
world would  indeed be one in which money had zero correlation with 
both output and prices-but  therefore also one in which the variation 
of output and prices would be much less than would have been the case 
if money  also varied.  In terms of Milton Friedman's classic  argument 
against  activist  policy,  the  variance  of  output (or prices)  a,  can  be 
expressed  as 
(5)  a.2  =  U2  +  U2  +  2p,zUM, 
where o2  reflects that part of o2  due to variance of money (or its growth 
rate),  o2  the part of  o2  due to factors independent of the variation of 
money,  and p the  correlation  between  these  two  components.  Fried- 
man's point was that fixed money growth would immediately eliminate 
both ofM and the covariance  term, leavingor2  simply equal to r-.24 
serve's  reliance  on  money  growth  targets  in  light  of  evidence  corresponding  to  that 
presented in figures 3-6. 
24.  Friedman ( 1953).  Friedman also went on to show that if the central bank attempts 
to offset  shocks  from other sourcesfully  (so that U2  =  U2),  activist policy  is stabilizing 
only if p <  -  1/2. This result has often been misunderstood,  however,  and its importance 
consequently  overstated.  In the presence of uncertainty, the optimal activist policy  is to Benjamin M.  Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  105 
As  figure  7  shows,  however,  the  disappearance  of  the  predictive 
content of money with respect to income and prices is certainly not due 
to a smaller variance of money growth.  The quarterly moving-average 
standard deviation  of  MI  growth,  measured with a ten-year window, 
increased  dramatically  at the beginning  of  the  1980s  and kept on  in- 
creasing-just  as  the predictive  content  was  vanishing,  as  shown  in 
figure 3. The moving-average  standard deviation of M2 growth behaved 
more irregularly over this period, but there is no evidence  of a system- 
atic trend toward smaller variance. 
A closely  related analog to Milton Friedman's  idea also suggests  a 
reason why-again,  in principle-money  might have lost its predictive 
content.  To recall,  the vector autoregression  methodology  underlying 
the results reported in the previous  section  infers the consequences  of 
fluctuations  in  money  solely  from  the  innovations  by  which  money 
departs from  whatever  is  its  typical  systematic  relationship  to  prior 
values  of  the other variables  in the system.25 The F  tests  underlying 
figures  4  and 6 therefore  test  the  incremental  predictive  power  of 
money,  over and above  that part of the fluctuation of output or prices 
that is  not already predictable  from past values  of  output and prices 
themselves  (and of the interest rate). The variance decompositions  re- 
ported in figures 3 and 5 likewise  refer to the share of the variation of 
output or prices attributable to the orthogonalized residuals in the equa- 
tion relating money to past values of these same variables. Hence if the 
observed  movements  of  money  consisted  entirely  of  systematic  re- 
sponses to prior movements of output, prices, and the interest rate, then 
these fluctuations in money might still have large effects  on output and 
prices, but they would be impossible  to detect within the standard VAR 
methodology.  (Moreover,  because  money  is ordered after output and 
prices  for purposes  of  the orthogonalization,  the same result follows 
for systematic responses of money to contemporaneous output and price 
movements.) 
Figure 8 shows  that this alternative version  of the hypothesis  is no 
more consistent  with  the facts  than the original.  For each  of  the  101 
offset expected shocks  less than fully (that is, 
U2  <  o<),  and so p need not be so negative 
as  -  1/2 for  policy  to  be  stabilizing;  Brainard's  (1967)  exposition  of  optimal  policy 
under uncertainty, though couched  in different terms,  in effect  makes this point. 
25.  This  point  again  stems  from  the  nature of  the  VAR  methodology,  which  can 
provide evidence  only  on chronological  precedence,  not causation; see footnote  16. 106  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure  7. Standard  Deviation  of Nominal  Money Growtha 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for figure 3. 
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Figure 8. Standard Deviation  of Orthogonalized  Money  Residualsa 
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samples used in constructing figures 3-6,  the respective panels of figure 
8 plot the standard deviation  of the orthogonalized  M 1 or M2 innova- 
tions.  In this  case,  instead  of  shrinking  as the predictive  content  of 
money  disappears,  the  nonsystematic  variation  of  both  M  1  and M2 
becomes  much larger. The standard deviation nearly doubles over time 
for both innovation  series. 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  STABILIZATION POLICY. A quite different  potential  ex- 
planation,  which  is  also  implicit  in  Milton  Friedman's  idea,  is  that 
money  has lost its predictive  content not because  the Federal Reserve 
has abandoned the attempt to stabilize  the economy  but because  it has 
largely succeeded  in doing so.  As equation 5 immediately  shows,  fluc- 
tuations in money  growth will  have an observable  effect  on output or 
prices if they are independent of the influence on these variables due to 
whatever  forces  are represented  within  o2-for  example,  shocks  to 
aggregate demand or aggregate supply. By contrast, if the central bank 
accurately  anticipates  those  independent  influences  and varies money 
growth so as to offset  them (that is,  p <  0),  then standard regression 
methods  may underestimate  the effect  due to money,  or miss  it alto- 
gether,  or possibly  even estimate the wrong sign for it. 
In principle,  this situation is just what vector autoregression-or,  for 
that matter,  partial regression,  as opposed  to  simple  correlation-is 
meant to address.  The problem,  however,  is that no simple regression 
system  includes  all relevant variables.  As Stephen Goldfeld  and Alan 
Blinder  and,  more  recently,  William  Poole  have  pointed  out,  if  the 
central bank varies money growth because it is seeking  to offset  some 
disturbance to output or prices that is not captured by the system's  other 
variables, then the regression will underestimate the effect of the change 
in money  growth,  and in the limit  it would  find zero effect.26 Worse 
yet,  if the central bank seeks  to offset  such disturbances only  in part, 
as is optimal in the presence  of uncertainty, then the regression would 
even  imply  the wrong  sign  for the effect  of  money  growth on output 
and prices.  (In  the  case  of  a positive  aggregate  demand  shock,  for 
example,  money would be smaller but subsequent output larger. For an 
adverse  aggregate  supply  shock,  money  would  be smaller but subse- 
quent prices higher.) 
Establishing whether or not increasingly effective  stabilization policy 
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by  the Federal Reserve  was responsible  for the disappearance of  the 
predictive content of money clearly requires an empirical approach that 
goes  beyond  the unstructured vector autoregression underlying the re- 
sults presented in the previous section.  In particular, some more struc- 
tured analysis  is necessary  to distinguish  the different behavioral dis- 
turbances that lie behind the residuals in the unstructured VAR. 
HYPOTHESIS  2:  UNSTABLE  MONEY  DEMAND.  Any  notion  that money 
covaries positively  and systematically  with output or prices-regardless 
of  whether  that covariation  is  taken  to  be  causal  or not-implicitly 
begins  from the assumption of a stable functional demand for money. 
As an enormous empirical literature has documented,  however,  during 
the last twenty years or so the demand for money (however defined) in 
the United  States has been far less  closely  and consistently  related to 
income,  prices,  interest rates,  and the other usual variables suggested 
by the standard theory of the demand for cash balances.  Familiar can- 
didate explanations  for this increased instability  include the effects  of 
advances  in data processing  technology,  deregulation,  innovations  in 
forms of deposit  holding  (prompted, in part, by both deregulation and 
changing  technology),  sharply  increasing  and then  decreasing  price 
inflation,  increasingly  integrated global financial markets, and so on.27 
When  money  demand is  unstable,  observed  fluctuations  in money 
need not anticipate  subsequent movements  of output or prices.  Faster 
money growth, for example,  could simply mean that the public is choos- 
ing to hold larger deposits  in place of other forms of wealth holding for 
reasons  unrelated  to  its  spending  or  production  decisions  (and,  of 
course,  that monetary policy  is allowing  this greater money demand to 
boost the observed money stock). This problem is likely to be especially 
severe in a modern financial system that offers myriad forms of liquid 
instruments, of which only an arbitrary subset is defined as any partic- 
ular measure of money  like MI  or M2. 
As in the case of hypothesis  1, establishing  whether increasing insta- 
bility of money demand is what has caused observed money to lose  its 
predictive content with respect to income and prices requires some kind 
of structural methodology.  More specifically,  the money residuals es- 
timated in  an unstructured VAR  do  not necessarily  represent money 
27.  Two  well-known  reviews  of  this  vast  literature are Judd and Scadding  (1982) 
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demand  shocks  alone,  and to  test  this  hypothesis  it  is  necessary  to 
identify  the distinct money demand shock component. 
HYPOTHESIS  3:  INEFFECTIVE  MONETARY  POLICY.  Finally,  a view  that 
has recently become popular in many nonacademic discussions  of mon- 
etary policy  is that modern economies,  in particular their financial sys- 
tems,  have  evolved  to the point that the central bank's  actions  have 
little influence over economic  activity anyway.28 The basic claim is that 
with  ever  more  institutions  able  to  advance  credit  and even  issue 
deposit-like  instruments without having to hold reserves at the central 
bank-familiar  examples  are brokerage firms,  money  market mutual 
funds, nonbank finance companies,  and, in some cases,  even insurance 
companies-the  central bank's  position  at the apex  of  the fractional 
reserve banking system  is no longer relevant.  Numerous empirical re- 
searchers have attempted to test this view,  and the evidence  has mostly 
not supported it.29 Even so,  it bears examination here as yet one more 
possible  reason why  money  has lost  its predictive  power with respect 
to output and prices. 
This explanation,  too,  requires a more structural approach to test it. 
In parallel with the need to distinguish  the unstructured VAR's  money 
residuals  from behavioral  money demand shocks,  what is needed here 
is to identify the structural shocks due to the central bank's independent 
monetary policy  actions  and the real economic  consequences  of those 
shocks. 30 
Testing the Three Structural Hypotheses 
What is needed,  then,  is an analytical framework that is capable of 
identifying,  from the output-prices-money-interest  rate autoregression 
system  presented  above,  structural disturbances corresponding  to ag- 
gregate demand (or,  IS)  shocks,  aggregate supply shocks,  money  de- 
mand shocks,  and monetary policy  shocks.  With a four-variable vector 
28.  See,  for  example,  the  lengthy  survey  aptly  entitled  "Who's  in  the  Driving 
Seat?,"  published  in the Economist,  October 7,  1995. 
29.  See,  for example,  Akhtar and Harris (1986),  Bosworth  (1989),  and Friedman 
(1989). 
30.  The  same  identification  objective  underlies,  for example,  Romer and Romer's 
(1989)  use  of  nonquantitative  data drawn from  the  minutes  of  Federal  Open  Market 
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autoregression,  and hence  a residual  variance-covariance  structure 
made up of ten distinct elements,  six restrictions are needed to render 
the system  "just identified"  in this way. 
Figures  9  and  10 plot  the  moving-average  standard deviations  of 
these  four structural shocks-aggregate  demand,  aggregate  supply, 
money demand, and monetary policy-derived  by applying the follow- 
ing set of six restrictions  suggested  by Jordi Gali for exactly  the four- 
variable  system  used  here.3'  First,  as  initially  suggested  by  Olivier 
Blanchard and Danny  Quah,  none  of  the three demand-side  disturb- 
ances-those  to aggregate demand,  money demand, or monetary pol- 
icy-has  a long-run  effect  on the  level  of  real output (three restric- 
tions).32  Second,  neither money demand disturbances nor money supply 
disturbances have  a within-quarter  effect  on real output (two  restric- 
tions).  And third, the demand for money  is such that demand for real 
balances depends on real output and the nominal interest rate (equal to 
inflation plus the implied  real interest rate), but not on either inflation 
or the real interest rate separately (one restriction).33 
As  Gali  demonstrates,  with  these  six  restrictions  the four-variable 
system estimated  previously  can be interpreted as consisting  of an ag- 
gregate demand equation (or IS curve),  an aggregate supply equation, 
a money  demand equation,  and an equation  representing  the within- 
quarter relationship among the interest rate, money,  output, and prices. 
Following  the discussion  and evidence  above,  this fourth relationship 
readily bears interpretation as a "monetary policy"  equation. 
The four-variable  system  underlying the results plotted in figures 9 
and 10 also  follows  Gali by specifying  the autoregression in terms of 
the growth rate of real output (Ax), the change in the federal funds rate 
(Ar), the level  of the federal funds rate minus the growth rate of prices 
(r  -  Ap) (in other words,  the level  of the real interest rate),  and the 
growth rate of  money  minus the growth rate of  prices  (Am  -  Ap).31 
This normalization is consistent with treating each of the four underlying 
3 1.  Gali (1992). 
32.  Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
33.  Gali also suggests  two potential alternatives to this sixth restriction-that  mon- 
etary  policy  does  not  respond  contemporaneously  to  real  output,  and  that monetary 
policy  does  not respond contemporaneously  to inflation-but  both are contradicted for 
quarterly time  aggregation  by  the  results  presented  in the first section  of  this  paper, 
based on monthly data. 
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Figure  9.  Standard  Deviation  of Structural  Shocks,  System with Mla 
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a. Based on a structural  VAR that includes log differences of real GDP and real balances, the change in the federal funds 
rate, and the difference between the level of the federal funds rate and the log-differenced implicit GDP deflator, with four 
lags on each variable. Data are quarterly. The structural  decomposition uses the covariance matrix computed over a forty- 
quarter rolling window.  Further  details on the identifying assumptions and estimation procedure are provided in the text. Benjamin  M. Friedman  and Kenneth  N. Kuttner  113 
Figure 10. Standard  Deviation  of Structural  Shocks, System  with M2a 
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variables-output,  inflation,  money  growth,  and the interest rate-as 
stationary in first differences.  It also implies  that the nominal interest 
rate and the inflation rate are cointegrated (so that the real interest rate 
is stationary),  as well  as that nominal money growth and inflation are 
cointegrated  (so that the growth of real balances is stationary).35 
One  way  of  capturing the  variation over  time  that is  the focus  of 
interest in this paper would  be to follow  the method used in deriving 
the unstructured VAR results presented in the second section-that  is, 
to  estimate  the  structural  VAR  separately  over  the  same  eighty-one 
sample  periods  and,  in  a manner directly  analogous  to  the  exercise 
underlying  figure 8,  examine  the resulting eighty-one  structural vari- 
ance-covariance  estimates  given by applying the Gali restrictions.  The 
alternative procedure used here,  in the interest of conserving  degrees 
of  freedom,  is  to estimate  the underlying  vector  autoregression  only 
once,  using  quarterly  data  for  1960:2-1995:2,  but  then  to  perform 
separately the decomposition  of the estimated VAR residuals into the 
four structural disturbances using a rolling ten-year window. 
The obvious  shortcoming  of this procedure is that it holds the coef- 
ficients on the lagged  variables constant over the entire thirty-five-year 
period. The benefit,  however,  is that the smaller number of parameters 
to be estimated permits the use of a shorter window  than in the earlier 
results  (forty  quarters versus  eighty,  but even  using  twenty  is  now  a 
possibility)  for estimating  the contemporaneous  relationships between 
the model's  variables  and the disturbances.  Especially  since  the con- 
temporaneous relationships embody most of the model's  structural con- 
tent,  the trade-off  seems  well  worthwhile.  Figure 9 plots the resulting 
moving-average standard  deviations for the system based on M1 growth, 
and figure 10 does the same for the system relying on M2 growth. 
The most obvious  lesson conveyed  visually by the changing standard 
deviations  of these structural disturbances is simply that they do indeed 
change over time-and,  most important for purposes of the implications 
of familiar ways  of  analyzing  alternative policy  regimes,  they change 
relative  to one another. In the system  where money growth is defined 
as M1,  aggregate demand shocks became sharply more variable in the 
late  1970s,  only to decline  in variability,  albeit more gradually, a dec- 
35.  See  Gali  (1992)  for  evidence  and  discussion  in  support of  these  stationarity 
assumptions.  Jordan and Lenz  (1996)  show  that assumptions  about stationarity matter 
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ade later.  (The dates shown on the horizontal axis give  the end of the 
rolling ten-year window.)  Aggregate  supply shocks became more var- 
iable with the first OPEC price increase in 1973, remained highly  var- 
iable through the early  1980s,  and since then have steadily declined  in 
variability.  Money  demand shocks  behaved  irregularly until the early 
1980s,  but then  became  progressively  more  variable  throughout the 
decade,  before  this  variability  also  declined  in the  1990s.  Monetary 
policy  shocks  irregularly increased in variability until the early  1980s, 
and since then have become  steadily  less  variable. 
What matters for most analyses  of alternative policy  regimes  is not 
just the absolute variability of any particular source of uncertainty but 
the variability of one kind of disturbance relative to another. In terms 
of  Poole's  classic  analysis,  for  example,  whether  it  is  better to  fix 
money growth (in a simple model in which it is feasible  to do so) or an 
interest rate depends,  in part, on the relative  variability of  aggregate 
demand shocks and money demand shocks (in Poole's  model, IS shocks 
and LM shocks,  respectively).36  As the top panel of figure  11 shows, 
while  at first they declined  in variability relative to aggregate demand 
shocks,  since  the mid-1980s  MI  money  demand shocks  have  sharply 
increased in variability relative to aggregate demand shocks.  The ratio 
of standard deviations  for ten-year windows  ending in the early  1990s 
is nearly double that for windows  ending in the first half of the 1980s. 
While  the correspondence  is not precise,  comparison of the top panel 
of figure 11 with either panel of figure 3 provides support for hypothesis 
2 among the different  possibilities  suggested  in the previous  section: 
that increasingly  unstable  money  demand has been  at least partly re- 
sponsible  for the disappearance of  the predictive  content of M1.  (An 
analogous plot of the standard deviation of money demand shocks rel- 
ative to that of aggregate supply shocks would show roughly the same 
pattern, especially  from about 1980 onward.) 
Figure  10 and the  lower  panel of  figure  11 tell  approximately  the 
same  story for the  system  based  on  M2.  In this representation  also, 
aggregate  demand  shocks  were  first more variable  and then less  so. 
Aggregate  supply  shocks  have  become  less  variable  since  the  early 
1980s,  and especially  so in the early  1990s.  The variability of money 
demand shocks has changed more irregularly, but the first few years of 
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Figure  11. Ratio of the Standard  Deviation  of Money Demand  Shocks to the 
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the  1980s  clearly  marked a low  point  and the first few  years  of  the 
1990s a high point.  The ratio of the respective  standard deviations  of 
money  demand shocks  and aggregate  demand shocks  (lower  panel of 
figure 11) again shows a relative movement very like what happened in 
the case  of MI.  Comparing this ratio to either panel of figure 5 again 
provides  support for hypothesis  2,  which  attributes the declining  pre- 
dictive  content of money to increased instability of money demand. 
What about the other two hypotheses  advanced in the previous sec- 
tion? A sharp implication  of hypothesis  1, which posits deliberate sta- 
bilizing  variation  of  money  to  offset  shocks  originating  from  other 
sources, is that those other nonpolicy  shocks should be playing a greater 
role  in determining  observed  money  growth.  The  evidence  from the 
relevant variance decompositions,  shown in figure 12, directly contra- 
dicts  this  proposition,  however.  The  percentage  of  the  variation  of 
observed M 1 growth attributable to aggregate demand shocks at a four- 
quarter horizon was at its peak (which,  even  so,  was only  17 percent) 
in 1980-when  MI  did have modest predictive content-and  since the 
mid-1980s  it has declined  to nearly zero.  The analogous percentage of 
the variation of M2 growth explained by aggregate demand shocks was 
larger in the early 1970s,  but since then it has been quite small through- 
out (note the difference  in scale  between the upper and lower panels), 
and it was nearly zero during much of the 1980s.  Comparing the upper 
and lower panels  of  figure  12 to figures 3 and 5,  respectively,  hardly 
generates confidence  in hypothesis  1. 
The  basic  assumption  underlying  hypothesis  3,  which  posits  a di- 
minished ability of the Federal Reserve  to influence economic  activity 
because of institutional changes in the financial system, is that monetary 
policy  shocks  have had a diminishing  impact on output. The evidence 
from the relevant impulse responses does provide some support for this 
proposition,  albeit only  for the few  most recent years.  The respective 
panels  of  figure  13 show  the  variation  over  time  in the  impact  of  a 
constant-value monetary policy  shock (a 100 basis point decline,  where 
the equation  is  normalized  on the federal  funds rate) on  the level  of 
output (hence the cumulation of the effect  on output growth due to the 
monetary policy  shock)  at an eight-quarter horizon.  Analogous  results 
for a four-quarter horizon are highly  similar. 
For the system based on M 1, the effect of a 100 basis point monetary 
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Figure 12. Contribution  of Aggregate  Demand Shocks to the Variance  of Money 
Growtha 
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Figure 13. Response  of Real GDP to a 100 Basis Point Monetary  Policy Shocka 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for figure 3. 
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0.8  percent,  until  the  early  1990s,  when  that impact  decreased  to 
slightly  over  0.6  percent.  In the system  based on M2,  the impact on 
output from a 100 basis point monetary policy  shock varied irregularly 
around an average  value  of  roughly  0.4  percent until the early  1990s 
and more recently  it has averaged approximately 0.25  percent.  Espe- 
cially  for  M 1,  the  timing  of  the  decline  does  not  match that of  the 
vanishing  predictive  content of money with respect to real output (see 
figures 3 and 5).  Even so, these results do provide some limited support 
for hypothesis  3. 
In sum, the evidence  drawn from this more structured analysis of the 
four-variable autoregression  system suggests that increasing instability 
of money  demand is the most consistent  explanation for the fact that, 
sometime  during the mid- to late  1980s,  fluctuations in money growth 
ceased  to anticipate subsequent fluctuations in either output or prices. 
The change  in empirical relationships  that presumably led the Federal 
Reserve to abandon its money growth targets, notwithstanding that the 
Congress's  Concurrent Resolution  133 remained in force, was therefore 
not merely  a creation  of  the Federal Reserve's  own  policy  regime  as 
hypothesis  1 (and hypothesis  0) implies.  In abandoning money growth 
targets,  the Federal Reserve  was therefore not just  "chasing  its tail," 
as wistful defenders of these targets have suggested.  Changes in objec- 
tive  conditions-new  technology,  deregulation,  new forms of deposit 
holding,  globalization,  and so on-over  time eroded the main behav- 
ioral prop that had always  underpinned the idea  of  basing  monetary 
policy  on  money  growth  targets: stable  money  demand.  The  Federal 
Reserve  simply  reacted accordingly. 
More General Lessons about Monetary Policy Rules 
What lessons  do these conclusions  provide for a regime that would 
dedicate U.S.  monetary policy  to a price stability target? 
The  currently  pending  Economic  Growth and Price  Stability  Act, 
which is sponsored by the chairman of the Joint Economic  Committee 
and  was  cosponsored  by  the  then  Senate  majority  leader,  gives  the 
Federal Reserve  System  two basic monetary policy  instructions:  "(1) 
establish  an explicit  numerical definition of the term 'price stability'; 
and (2) maintain a monetary policy  that effectively promotes  long-term Benjamin M.  Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  121 
price  stability"  (emphasis  added).37 The proposed bill  specifically  re- 
peals the Full Employment  and Balanced  Growth Act of  1978,  which 
constitutes the current congressional  instruction on monetary policy.  It 
also  explicitly  amends  the  Employment  Act  of  1946,  insofar  as that 
legislation  applies to monetary policy. 
For purposes of comparison,  the section  of the current Federal Re- 
serve  Act  (as  amended  under  the  Full  Employment  and Balanced 
Growth Act) that the pending bill proposes to replace by the language 
quoted  above  instructs  the  Federal  Reserve  to  "maintain  long  run 
growth of the monetary and credit aggregates  commensurate with the 
economy's  long run potential to increase production, so as to promote 
effectively  the goals  of maximum employment, stable prices,  and mod- 
erate long-term interest rates"  (emphasis  added).38 
Reading the current and the proposed language together makes clear 
that what  is  new  in the  pending  bill  is  not that the Federal Reserve 
would  be  instructed  to  seek  price  stability,  but that it would  be  in- 
structed to seek only price stability.39 A subsequent section of the pend- 
ing bill  also  instructs the Federal Reserve  to  "take  into account  any 
potential short-term effects  on employment  and output,"  but this sec- 
tion refers to the initial transition to price stability,  presumably from a 
starting point of positive  inflation.40 Moreover,  the specific  injunction 
to pursue "long-term  price stability"  presumably means that, after this 
initial  transition,  any  episodes  of  price  increase  are to  be  offset  by 
subsequent episodes  of absolute price decline.  Unlike in the more gen- 
eral case  of  a period-by-period  inflation target,  a target of  long-term 
price stability means that bygones  are not simply bygones. 
Setting a target for a variable like prices that constitutes an ultimate 
goal of monetary policy  is,  of course,  not the same as setting an inter- 
mediate target for a variable like money.  In terms of Guy Debelle  and 
37.  Economic  Growth and Price  Stability Act of 1995,  S.  1266,  104 Cong.  I sess. 
(GPO,  1995),  p. 4. 
38.  Federal  Reserve  Act,  sect.  2A,  para.  1,  in  Federal  Reserve  Act  and  Other 
Statutory Provisions  Affecting the Federal  Reserve System (Washington: Board of Gov- 
ernors of the Federal Reserve  System,  1988). 
39.  The  proposed  bill  would  also  eliminate  the  instruction to formulate  monetary 
policy  in  terms  of  money  (and  credit)  growth  targets.  As  the  evidence  discussed  in 
earlier sections  of  this  paper indicates,  this change  is well  warranted and has already 
been implemented  by the Federal Reserve,  even  while  the existing  instruction remains 
in force. 
40.  Economic  Growth and Price  Stability Act of 1995,  pp. 5-6. 122  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Stanley Fischer's  useful taxonomy,  "goal  independence"  and "instru- 
ment independence"  differ in ways that are important in principle and 
potentially  important in practice.4' Legislating  targets like price stabil- 
ity, or maximum employment,  or stability of the banking and financial 
system,  means  that the higher authority to which  the central bank is 
responsible  is defining  what contribution monetary policy  is expected 
to  make  to  the  nation's  economic  well-being.  By  contrast,  under a 
legislated  interest  rate rule  or reserves  rule,  that higher  authority is 
telling  the central bank not only  what objectives  to  achieve  but also 
how,  operationally,  to  go  about doing  so.  Legislating  a target for  a 
variable like money  growth represents an intermediate stage,  but over 
time horizons long enough to render money growth controllable,  it too 
means that the central bank does not have instrument independence. 
As Debelle  and Fischer and others have shown,  there is a good case 
for giving  the central bank instrument independence but not goal inde- 
pendence.  No  legislated  rule governing  the  instruments of  monetary 
policy  can plausibly  take account  of  the vast  range of  unforeseeable 
circumstances  to which actual central banks need to respond on a real- 
time basis,  including just the kind of changes in empirical relationships 
that the  evidence  presented  in  this  paper documents  for  the  United 
States.  And as this U.S.  experience demonstrates, legislated targets for 
intermediate variables  like money  growth suffer from the same short- 
coming.  By contrast,  for monetary policy  to pursue basic goals  deter- 
mined by the higher governmental authority that is the ultimate source 
of the central bank's political legitimacy-under  the U.S.  Constitution, 
that means the Congress-is  no more than what is consistent  with the 
fundamental principles  of a democracy. 
Merely  drawing the distinction  between  goal  independence  and in- 
strument independence,  however,  does not constitute an argument that 
a price-stability  target-or,  for that matter, any other specification  of 
goals-is  necessarily  a good  way to conduct monetary policy.  To the 
contrary, several well-known  analyses have shown that a price-stability 
target makes  good  sense  for monetary policy  under some  conditions, 
but not others.  The usual conclusion  is that when wage  rates are not 
fully  flexible,  holding  prices  stable  is not optimal  in the presence  of 
supply shocks that represent disturbances to productivity.  By contrast, 
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holding prices stable may be optimal under some circumstances as long 
as the disturbances to the economy  consist  entirely of demand shocks 
of one kind or another. 
Joshua Aizenman  and Jacob Frenkel,  for example,  demonstrate the 
nonoptimality of a strict stable-price monetary policy  in a static model 
in which supply shocks are explicitly  productivity shocks and the basic 
impediment that prevents the economy  from reaching the correct post- 
shock  equilibrium  is  inflexible  wages.42 Simply  put,  the argument is 
that this new equilibrium warrants a changed real wage  (higher after a 
favorable  productivity  shock,  lower  after an adverse  shock).  But  if 
wages are not fully flexible,  holding prices stable prevents the real wage 
from adjusting as it should. 
For example,  a  large  literature has  compared  the  more favorable 
growth  and employment  experience  of  the  United  States  to  the  less 
favorable  European experience  in the  years  following  the OPEC oil 
shocks  of  1973 and 1979,  in just the manner suggested  by this line of 
analysis.  To be sure, part of the difference between the respective post- 
OPEC experiences  of the United States and Europe stems from differ- 
ences  in labor market institutions.  But the message  of Aizenman  and 
Frenkel's  analysis,  and the  host  of  similar  models,  is  that the  U.S. 
experience  would have been very different had the price level  not been 
able to adjust.  In particular, given  the downward rigidity  of  nominal 
wage rates, an increase in the price level  was necessary to bring about 
lower  real  wages  in  line  with  the  adverse  productivity  shock  due  to 
OPEC.43  Under a price stability target, the Federal Reserve would have 
had to pursue a sufficiently  tight monetary policy to prevent that rise in 
prices,  thereby also preventing the downward reduction in real wages 
that kept such a large fraction of the U.S.  labor force employed.  And 
if prices  had risen anyway  (nobody pretends that the central bank has 
perfect  control  over  the price level  in the short run), the no-bygones 
character of  a long-term  price stability  target means that the Federal 
Reserve  would  have  had to maintain this tight policy  long  enough  to 
drive the price level  back down. 
In making arguments like these  it is important to be clear that what 
enables an economy  to adjust to supply shocks is not a new permanent 
42.  Aizenman  and Frenkel (1986). 
43.  See the evidence  reviewed  by Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry in this volume on the 
downward rigidity of nominal wages  in the United States. 124  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
level  of  inflation but rather a once-and-for-all  change,  up or down,  in 
the price level.  (In principle, there could perhaps be a permanent stream 
of productivity shocks,  but that idea strains the notion of a shock.)  This 
distinction cannot be explicit  in static models like that of Aizenman and 
Frenkel, but it is so in Kenneth Rogoff's  dynamic model.44 Here again, 
what  makes  holding  to  a price  stability  policy  target  suboptimal  is 
shocks to productivity  when wage rates are not fully  flexible. 
Rogoff's  main result is that while placing a large weight on inflation 
stabilization  relative to employment  stabilization  reduces the long-run 
average rate of inflation associated with the time inconsistency  problem, 
doing so "suboptimally  raises the variance of employment when supply 
shocks  are large."45 While the optimal policy  regime therefore places 
large weight  on inflation stabilization,  it does not focus  exclusively  on 
price objectives.  Moreover,  a long-run price stability target, which not 
only places  exclusive  weight on prices but also requires that any inad- 
vertent price level  changes (for example,  in response to supply shocks) 
be offset  by subsequent price level  changes  in the opposite  direction, 
represents an extreme form of Rogoff's  suboptimality. 
Evaluating just how serious these problems would be in practice, for 
the  United  States  or any  other country,  would  require an analytical 
apparatus well  beyond that developed  in this paper. As Aizenman  and 
Frenkel, Rogoff,  and many others have shown, the crucial comparisons 
depend  not only  on  the variance-covariance  structure of  the relevant 
disturbances but also on the magnitudes of key structural parameters.46 
Moreover,  it would also be necessary to distinguish supply shocks that 
represent disturbances to productivity from supply shocks that merely 
change the economy's  "natural"  rate of output without affecting  pro- 
duction relationships  at the margin.47 Constructing such a model  and 
then  carrying  out  this  kind  of  exercise-comparatively  evaluating  a 
price-stability  target, an inflation target, a nominal income target, var- 
ious  mixed  inflation-output  or  inflation-employment  targets  (for  the 
44.  Rogoff (1985). 
45.  Rogoff (1985, p. 1169). 
46.  The same is true in simpler models like Poole's (1970) that incorporate  only 
demand-side  disturbances. 
47.  This distinction emerges especially clearly from the exchange between Bean 
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sake of  nostalgia,  even  a money  growth target)-would  perhaps be a 
useful endeavor. 
But the main lesson of this look back at the Federal Reserve System's 
experience  with money growth targets is that even if the relevant rela- 
tionships (as seen today) did appear to warrant adopting a price-stability 
rule,  there is little  ground for confidence  that they would  continue  to 
do so over the length of  time that would  make legislating  this or any 
other  monetary  policy  target  sensible.  For a while  money  did  have 
significant  predictive  content  with respect  to income  and prices,  and 
the Federal Reserve  did formulate money  growth targets and respond 
to deviations of observed money from these targets in setting the federal 
funds rate. The underlying money-output and money-price relationships 
changed,  however-not  merely  as a consequence  of  the Federal Re- 
serve's  own  changed  regime,  but mostly  because  money  demand be- 
came functionally  unstable.  In other words,  a key behavioral disturb- 
ance that once appeared quantitatively modest enough to be acceptable 
(even though qualitatively  it was obviously  not helpful under a money- 
growth-target  strategy)  later became  much more volatile,  both abso- 
lutely and relative to other kinds of shocks. 
Hence even  if productivity shocks were to look sufficiently  small at 
any given  time  to  warrant adopting a price-stability  target-and  not- 
withstanding the declines  shown in figures 9 and 10, that case remains 
to be made-there  is no assurance that they would not likewise  grow 
more volatile.  If that happened,  and if the Congress  had legislated  a 
price  stability  target,  the Federal Reserve  would  once  again face  the 
dilemma of either holding to a poorly designed monetary policy  frame- 
work or disregarding the legal instructions issued by the higher govern- 
mental authority to which  it is accountable.  Neither choice  would  do 
much to enhance the cause of responsible  monetary policymaking. Comments 
and Discussion 
Mark  Gertler:  This paper is really two in one.  First, it is a fascinating 
account  of  the  rise  and fall  of  monetary  targeting.  Second,  it  is  an 
attempt to  use  this  experience  to  evaluate  recent  proposals  to  make 
price stability the main objective  of monetary policy. 
The main conclusion  that the authors reach is a familiar one: in the 
world that we live in, writing down a tightly specified policy rule is not 
a  realistic  option.  The  problem,  of  course,  is  unforeseen  structural 
shocks.  In the case  of  monetary targeting,  the culprits are money  de- 
mand shocks.  In the case of price level  (or inflation) targeting, they are 
supply  shocks.  In the  end,  the  authors seem  to  argue,  discretion  is 
working well,  so just stick with it: "If  it ain't broke, don't fix it." 
The  authors make  a strong case.  While  I am sympathetic  to  their 
sentiments,  I am not so sure that the issue is as clear cut as they suggest. 
Both they and I, as well as many others, believe  that the record of U.S. 
monetary policy  over  the last fifteen  years has been exceptional.  But 
many of us also believe  that it was not so good during most of the 1  960s 
and 1970s. If, for example,  Friedman and Kuttner had written this paper 
in  1972 or 1977,  would they still have argued in favor of unmitigated 
discretion?  Or would they instead have argued the need for some kind 
of insurance against another episode  of Burns or Miller policymaking? 
Put differently,  are there no mechanisms  available to guarantee that 
the good  aspects  of  recent  policymaking  are carried into the future? 
(After  all,  Alan  Greenspan cannot remain in office  forever.)  Even  if 
extreme proposals for price level or inflation targeting are unattractive, 
are there not more moderate versions (for example,  medium-term infla- 
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tion targets with clearly  articulated escape  clauses)  that might do the 
job? This issue  at least deserves  serious discussion. 
The Rise of Monetary and (Implicit) Inflation Targeting After Octo- 
ber 1979.  To flesh the matter out, I first present some evidence  on the 
key differences  in U.S.  monetary policy before and after October 1979. 
In doing  so,  I provide  a different perspective  on the authors' story of 
the rise and fall of monetary targeting,  although one that is quite com- 
plementary. I argue that the rise of monetary targeting was symptomatic 
of  a (so far) permanent change  in the response  of  monetary policy  to 
inflation that took place in October  1979. This change appears to have 
involved  the adoption of an implicit form of inflation targeting.  While 
monetary targeting has been effectively  abandoned, this kind of implicit 
inflation targeting remains.  Further, it is quite consistent  with what I 
describe  below  as moderate proposals  to target inflation.  Whether or 
not it is advisable to codify  a form of this rule is an open question.  But 
before  there is  any discussion  of  policy  proposals,  it is  important at 
least  to  identify  the central features  of  a monetary policy  era that is 
generally  regarded as having been effective. 
Turning to the data, the top panel of figure Al  plots the federal funds 
rate and inflation using quarterly data over the period  1965:1-1994:1. 
Inflation is measured as the percent change  in the price level  over the 
previous  four  quarters.  The  bottom  panel  measures  the  ex  post  real 
funds rate, using this measure of inflation. 
The  graphs  strongly  suggest  a  structural break  in  the  funds  rate 
process  after October  1979.  (Others have  made this point formally.) 
During most of the 1970s,  the real federal funds rate was equal to zero 
or negative.  It began to rise sharply in October 1979. While more than 
monetary policy  influences  the real interest rate, it surely provides the 
most logical  explanation for the sharp rise in the real federal funds rate 
around this time.  Note,  in addition, that small pickups in inflation after 
October  1979  were  met  with  sharp increases  in  the  funds  rate  (for 
example,  in 1984 and 1988.)  A similar systematic response to inflation 
is not apparent before October  1979. 
Where does monetary targeting fit in? As the authors show,  monetary 
targeting was introduced in October 1979 and remained largely in effect 
through 1982.  (The unusually  bumpy behavior of the funds rate over 
this period is consistent  with the introduction of this policy.)  As I have 
suggested above,  the move to monetary targeting reflected a fundamen- 128  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
tal shift in the way the Fed would respond to inflation, as opposed to a 
mere technical  change in operating procedures. The shift in policy  was 
probably based on two considerations.  The first was that a money target 
could provide a nominal anchor for the price level.  The second was that 
such a shift  in operating procedures could  provide political  cover  for 
the  nearly  1,000  basis  point  increase  in  the  federal  funds  rate that 
occurred over this period. 
Figure  Al.  Inflation  and the Federal Funds  Rate 
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To demonstrate formally  the change  in policymaking,  I estimate  a 
variant of  Friedman and Kuttner's  policy  rule that omits  the  money 
target and,  instead,  allows  for a break in the coefficients  on inflation 
and the output gap at October 1979.'1  use quarterly rather than monthly 
data, and I use the log  difference  of real GDP from a quadratic trend 
to measure slackness  in the real economy,  instead of the authors' un- 
employment  gap.  Both these changes  make the specification  closer,  in 
spirit, to Taylor's  familiar rule,  thus facilitating  comparison with that 
analysis  as well.2  Finally,  like the authors, I include the lagged  funds 
rate to soak up serial correlation that is otherwise present in the data. 
The equations below  show estimates  of the policy  reaction function 
for the whole  sample period,  1965:2-1994:1,  and for two subsamples, 
1965:2-1979:3  and 1974:4-1994:1.  The estimates,  with standard  errors 
in parentheses,  are presented  along  with  calculations  of  the  implied 
target funds rate (the rate that would  arise after full adjustment to thr 
lagged funds rate). 
1965:2-1994:1r,  =  0.07  +  0.12fL,  +  0.22YGAPt  +  O.91r, 
(0.28)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
r=  0.78  +  1.27H,  +  2.44YGAP, 
1965:2-1979:3  r,  =  0.74  +  0.0811,  +  0.37YGAP,  +  0.81r, 
(0.34)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
r=  3.87  +  0.4L0H  +  1.75YGAPt 
1979:4-1994:1r,  =  0.13  +  0.5717,  +  0.14YGAPt  +  0.68rt,_ 
(0.39)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
r=  0.41  +  1.75HL  +  0.44YGAPt, 
where r  the federal funds rate; r"-  the target funds rate; H  =the 
percent  change  in  the  price  level  over  the  past year times  100; and 
YGAP  the log difference  of output from a quadratic trend times  100. 
1.  I identify the break in October 1979 on the basis of preliminary work with Richard 
Clarida.  As  Alan  Blinder  noted  at the  Brookings  Panel  meeting,  there  is  also  some 
evidence  of  a change  in policy  between  the  tenures of  Volcker  and Greenspan.  This 
change,  however,  lies mainly in the response of the federal funds rate to the output gap, 
rather than to inflation-there  was a weaker response to output under Volcker than under 
Greenspan. Nevertheless,  the key point is that it is reasonable to identify the shift in the 
policy  response to inflation as having occurred in October  1979. 
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For the whole  sample,  the reaction function  suggests  a modest  re- 
sponse to inflation and an aggressive  response to the output gap. Once 
one splits the sample,  however,  one observes  sharp differences  across 
the subperiods.  In the first subperiod,  the response of the funds rate to 
a  1 percent rise  in inflation  is only  40  basis points.  This  implies  that 
the Fed actually let the real funds rate drop in response to rising infla- 
tion, everything else equal. It responded aggressively  to the output gap, 
adjusting the funds rate by  175 basis points in response to a 1 percent 
change  in the  output gap.  The  impression  that these  estimates  gives 
accords with the popular view  that over this period,  the Fed placed  a 
high  priority  on  stabilizing  the real economy,  but paid only  limited 
attention to reining in inflation. 
The  response  to  inflation  increases  sharply in the later subperiod. 
The  target rate rises  by  175  basis  points  in response  to  a  1 percent 
increase  in inflation,  implying  a significant,  75 basis point rise in the 
real rate. The Fed remained responsive  to the output gap, but the coef- 
ficients drop to 44 basis points.  Interestingly,  the coefficients  on infla- 
tion  and the  output  gap  are quite  close  to  those  with  which  Taylor 
characterizes  the Greenspan era (150  basis points on inflation and 50 
basis points on output). 
One can interpret the policy  reaction function in the second  half of 
the sample  as embedding  an inflation target, in the sense  that the Fed 
adjusted the real funds rate to bring inflation back to the desired level. 
To  be  sure,  the  estimated  rule  also  allows  for  output  stabilization. 
However,  since  future inflation depends on the output gap today,  sta- 
bilizing  output may be viewed  as a preemptive attack on inflation,  and 
thus is compatible  with a number of inflation targeting proposals. 
The Demise of Monetary Targeting. While implicit inflation targeting 
has  remained  a feature  of  monetary  policy  since  October  1979,  the 
Federal Reserve  abandoned monetary targeting relatively  soon after its 
inception.  I share the authors' view that the volatile behavior of money 
demand accounts for the demise of monetary targeting. Again,  pictures 
tell  the story.  The top panel of  figure A2 plots  real GDP growth and 
the log of the ratio of MI  to nominal GDP,  or equivalently,  minus the 
log of velocity,  over the period 1965:1-1994:  1. The bottom panel does 
the same for M2. 
The volatile  behavior of MI velocity  is apparent from the plot in the 
top panel.  For much of the pre-Volcker period, Ml  velocity  increased Benjamin M.  Friedman  and Kenneth N.  Kuttner  131 
Figure  A2.  Velocity and Real GDP  Growth 
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sharply; the  pace  picked  up around  1973,  as  nominal  rates began  a 
sharp ascent.  Both formal and anecdotal evidence  suggests that the Fed 
had great difficulty  in tracking the course of Ml  during this period. The 
change in policy  under Volcker only compounded this difficulty.  After 
an initial  sharp increase  (due to the tightening),  MI  velocity  reversed 
course  and began to fall.  The introduction of  interest-bearing M1 ac- 
counts (NOW accounts) was responsible for this phenomenon.  In 1986 
MI rose sharply as the economy  weakened.  It is not surprising that the 
Fed downgraded  its MI  target at this time,  as the authors report. The 
shift in the trend of M1 velocity  after 1979 that is reflected in the graph 
explains  why the authors find a rise in MI  shocks during this period. 
As the bottom panel indicates,  there is a fairly tight relation between 
M2 velocity  and real GDP growth until about 1991. This explains  why 
several  analysts  have found that M2 velocity  forecasts  output growth 
well  over this period.  However,  the relation clearly breaks down after 
1991.  The growth of bond and stock mutual funds sucked assets from 
M2 accounts,  and M2 velocity  rose,  despite the fact that the economy 
picked  up.  The break in the pattern of M2 velocity  is consistent  with 
the authors' findings that M2 demand shocks rose during this period. 
Moderate  Proposals  for  Targeting Inflation.  The breakdown in the 
M2 relation prompted a search for other nominal anchors in the United 
States.  In this context,  proposals to target inflation began to crop up. 
Friedman and Kuttner concentrate on an extreme version of such propo- 
sals that sets a strict target for the path of the price level.  I am sympa- 
thetic  to  their  skepticism  about pure price  level  targeting.  But  it  is 
important to  recognize  that there  exists  a family  of  more  moderate 
proposals  in this vein,  all of which attempt, in one way or another, to 
meet  the kinds  of  objections  raised by Friedman and Kuttner. In the 
absence  of a compelling  argument that discretion will  always  work as 
well  in  the  future  as  it  does  today,  these  more  moderate  proposals 
deserve  scrutiny. 
The moderate proposals differ from the more extreme versions in the 
following  ways: 
-Targeting  inflation versus the price level:  It is now widely  recog- 
nized that measurement error induces a positive  drift in the major price 
indexes.  The estimated  drift in the CPI due to measurement error, for 
example,  is  about  1 percent per year.  (The main problem lies  in ac- 
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proposals  advocate  targeting  inflation,  as opposed  to the price level. 
The Bundesbank,  for example,  sets its goal  for inflation at 2 percent, 
in order to allow  for measurement error. 
-Should  bygones  be  bygones?  The extreme  policies  require that 
overshooting  the target in one  year be made up by equivalent  under- 
shooting  in the next.  In theory,  it should not be a problem for the Fed 
to engineer this undershooting,  since fully credible disinflations should 
be painless.  Unfortunately,  there is  no hard evidence  to support this 
theory. Further, supply shocks can cause complications,  as the authors 
duly note. 
The moderate inflation target policies,  therefore, forgive past errors. 
After a stated period,  the targets are benchmarked anew,  without ref- 
erence to any deviations  in the previous period. The length of time over 
which  an inflation rate is to be maintained (for example,  one year,  or 
two,  or three)  varies  across  plans.  The  Bundesbank,  for  example, 
benchmarks on an annual basis. 
-Multiple  objectives:  A virtue of an explicitly  stated inflation goal 
is that it holds  the policymakers  accountable.  There is little  disagree- 
ment that the Fed should be held accountable for the medium- and long- 
term performance of inflation.  Yet,  while the Fed clearly cannot influ- 
ence the long-term behavior of the real economy,  its decisions  do have 
consequences  for  short-run behavior.  Should  it be  completely  unac- 
countable for the short-run  performance of the real economy? Or, should 
real short-run performance enter as a weighted objective,  along with in- 
flation? These questions involve some complicated considerations. 
Again, examining the behavior of the Bundesbank can be instructive. 
While the Bundesbank has formal targets for money growth and infla- 
tion,  it does  allow  exchange  rate considerations  to influence its policy 
decisions.  Thus, at least implicitly,  it appears to pursue monetary policy 
with multiple objectives  in mind.3 
Finally,  it is true that moderate proposals for inflation targeting allow 
for a more flexible  policy  rule than the strict price level  targeting that 
Friedman and Kuttner characterize.  Does this flexibility  undermine the 
discipline  over policymaking  that such a rule is supposed to provide? I 
do not think so. At a minimum, introducing the kinds of guidelines  that 
these proposals  suggest  forces  a focused  discussion  of policy.  If there 
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is a deviation  from the guidelines,  the policymaker must explain.  Such 
discussions  may be one way to ensure that good policies  are carried on 
and bad ones  are left behind. 
James  Tobin: This paper is a worthy sequel to the long series of Fried- 
man's contributions  to the study of monetary policy,  many of them at 
the Brookings  Panel,  many of  them with  younger  collaborators  who 
have gone on to productive professional  careers. Clearly the Friedman- 
Kuttner team  is  another fruitful  partnership. Friedman and company 
always  call  the  shots  as  they  see  them,  independent  of  schools  of 
thought and policy  lines. 
Price Stability as the Mandated Goal of Monetary Policy.  The paper 
begins and ends by claiming relevance to proposed legislation  to estab- 
lish price stability as the exclusive  target of Federal Reserve policy.  At 
the end of the paper, the authors mount a devastating attack on the so- 
called  Economic  Growth and Price Stability  Act-which  has nothing 
to do with economic  growth,  but exemplifies  the fashion of decorative 
titles for statutes-which  would instruct the Fed to define and maintain 
a monetary policy  that "effectively  promotes  long-term  price  stabil- 
ity,"  to the exclusion  of the employment  and output goals  of existing 
mandates.  Friedman and Kuttner eloquently  condemn  this bill,  and I 
applaud their appraisal. 
Their criticism of this proposal stands on its own feet,  independent of 
their analysis of  experience  with mandated targets for monetary aggre- 
gates.  After all,  those M targets were not goals,  like price stability, but 
intermediate instruments. The authors cite with approval the distinction 
between central bank "goal  independence,"  which they regard as inap- 
propriate, and "instrument independence,"  of which they approve. The 
Fed felt justified in suspending or abandoning the monetary rules when 
they found them inconsistent with the basic goals  to which they were 
committed by statute. They would not be free to abandon a price stability 
commitment, no matter how unpleasant its by-products. 
The  thrust of  the  proposed  rule  is  to  tell  the Fed  not  to  let  their 
attention be diverted by worries about employment and output and their 
growth.  Its sponsors  evidently  adhere to the New  Classical  view  that 
monetary events  and policies  have no real consequences.  This is,  after 
all,  the prevailing  orthodoxy of central bankers throughout the world. 
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pragmatic U.S.  monetary policies  over the last fifteen years,  both ab- 
solutely  and relative to other countries.  Perhaps they lay the praise on 
a little thick. The great disinflation of  1979-82  may, as they say, have 
cost  no more than estimates  of  sacrifice ratios of the time,  but it cost 
no less,  even though many advocates of resolute,  preannounced auster- 
ity promised that it would reduce the cost.  Some observers saw no need 
for the continuation  of  austere monetary goals  well  into  1982.  More 
recently,  the Fed tolerated subpar growth rates for almost four years, 
from  1989 to  1992. 
Yet I generally concur with the authors' opinion that the Volcker and 
Greenspan FOMCs were successful  in fine-tuning their policies  to mac- 
roeconomic  performance, measured by employment and output, as well 
as prices and inflation.  They did not tie themselves  to targets for mon- 
etary aggregates,  nor to any fixed rules. The Taylor-type response func- 
tions  that explain  the  federal  funds  rate  in  table  1 depict  balanced 
attention to ultimate macroeconomic  variables,  real and nominal. 
The drawbacks of a "price stability only"  rule are quite obvious.  In 
the case  of the OPEC supply shocks,  such a rule would have entailed 
even higher costs in lost output and jobs than were inflicted by the deep 
recessions  of  1974-75  and 1979-82.  In the present case,  this would be 
especially  true because,  as Friedman and Kuttner explain,  the language 
of the bill would require any increase in the price level  to be reversed. 
Even a monetary stimulus to recovery from an ordinary business cycle 
recession  would be ruled out if it were to raise prices. 
If inflation stability were an officially  mandated goal,  there are two 
long  well  known,  good  reasons  for choosing  a rate above  zero.  The 
first is that it is easier to make the real wage adjustments inevitable  in 
a dynamic  economy  if  real  wages  can  be  reduced  without  lowering 
nominal wages.  The special  obstacles  to employers'  cutting of money 
wages  may seem irrational, but recent research confirms that they still 
exist.  The paper by Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry in this volume  offers 
and tests  an  ingenious  model  of  asymmetric  nominal  wage  inertia. 
According  to that model,  the unemployment  cost of  inflation stability 
is significantly higher the lower the long-run inflation rate target, at least 
for low inflation rates. The argument and the model resemble those of my 
presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1971.' 
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The second reason applies to interest rates, a point made by Takatoshi 
Ito in the discussion  of the paper by Akerlof,  Dickens,  and Perry. In 
some business  cycles  there are times when negative  real interest rates 
on short safe assets may be needed to reverse recessions  or to maintain 
prosperities.  This  does  not imply  that real rates on debts with longer 
maturities and higher risks, the rates relevant to demands for goods and 
services,  need  be  negative.  If  trend inflation  is  zero,  given  that the 
nominal federal funds rate cannot be negative,  the real rate can never 
be negative.  This constraint on monetary policy would be relaxed if the 
ongoing  trend inflation rate were,  for example,  3 percent. This consid- 
eration has additional  strength because  the abandonment of fiscal  sta- 
bilizers,  built-in and discretionary,  places the entire burden of counter- 
cyclical  stabilization  on monetary policy. 
The Rise and Fall  of Monetary Aggregate  Targets.  Pursuant to Con- 
current Resolution  133,  the  FOMC announced  M targets from  1975 
through 1986.  Resolution  133 is still on the books,  but in practice the 
Fed  ceased  to take M targets  seriously  in  1983,  formally  abandoned 
MI in 1987, and explicitly  downgraded other M's in 1993. The authors 
take formal announcements  too  literally  in dating the last year of  the 
money  targeting era as 1986,  instead of  1982. 
The general  conclusion  of  the paper is that the Fed took  monetary 
aggregates  seriously  when,  because  of their informational content re- 
garding future values of true ultimate goals (output and prices),  the M's 
were  worth taking  seriously.  Likewise,  the Fed stopped  taking them 
seriously  in the  1980s,  when they no longer conveyed  useful  informa- 
tion because  the demand functions  for monetary aggregates had fallen 
apart. 
The authors try to find out whether the FOMC took M targets seri- 
ously  enough  to correct divergences  from them,  by setting the federal 
funds  rates higher  or lower  than observations  of  inflation and unem- 
ployment  would have called  for. The regressions  that they compute to 
explain Federal Reserve  settings of policy  instruments merit praise for 
the painstaking use of regressors as the Fed knew them in making policy 
at each date, not as they are known in revised statistics today. There is 
not much evidence  of  the responses  that the authors are looking  for, 
except  for in the period  1979-82  (table  1). Indeed,  the regressions  in 
table  I give  little  evidence  that the Fed took anything very seriously, 
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the macroeconomic  variables,  real and nominal,  more seriously  than 
these regressions  show. 
The specifications  of the Taylor policy  response functions in table  1 
are questionable.  For one reason,  in the equations with lagged depen- 
dent variables past values of r explain too much. True, there is consid- 
erable persistence  in the federal funds rate, some of it beyond what the 
persistence  of inflation and unemployment would explain.  This can be 
attributed to the reluctance of the FOMC to change its instrument setting 
very frequently,  and especially  to reverse course. This reluctance could 
be modeled by requiring the value of the response function to exceed  a 
threshold before  a change  in the instrument is voted,  and to require a 
particularly high threshold to justify a policy reversal. The Fed has been 
fine-tuning,  but does  not move the funds rate at every meeting. 
In table 2 the dependent variable is shifted from the funds rate to an 
alternative  operating  instrument,  unborrowed reserves.  The  result  is 
quite interesting. In 1979-82  a positive M I discrepancy appears to have 
led to a corrective  contraction of unborrowed reserves.  In other years 
before and after, a positive  M 1 discrepancy was accommodated by new 
reserve supplies.  These results are consistent with the widely held view, 
supported by the Fed's  own statements,  that in the period dedicated to 
disinflation  (1979-82)  the Fed concentrated on quantitative operating 
instruments  (reserves)  and quantitative  intermediate goals  (monetary 
aggregates),  while in other years their primary operating target was the 
federal funds rate, and other interest rates and credit market conditions 
competed  with  the  M's  as  intermediate  goals.  During  1979-82,  the 
funds rate was left to the market, and all interest rates became extremely 
volatile.  For  symmetry,  table  2 might  include  regressions  to  test 
whether different  levels  of,  or changes  in,  the funds rates made any 
difference  to the dependent variable,  unborrowed reserves. 
Tables  1 and 2 provide  some evidence  that the Fed took M targets 
seriously at times.  However,  figures 1 and 2, which concern the interest 
rate equations-no  similar calculations  are presented for the equations 
in table 2-say  that those years were principally  1979-82,  a period for 
which the equation  is misspecified  anyway.  A lesser  bulge appears in 
1983-85,  when,  according to independent information,  the M's  were 
already being downgraded. 
These bulges are especially  apparent in the upper panels of figures 1 
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lower  panels  are  the  more  informative.  The  Kalman-filtered  and 
Kalman-smoothed  interest rate equations  are intended to generate the 
best information,  as of today's  date,  on how the Fed had been setting 
the funds rate, taking account of the possibility  that the coefficients  of 
the M error variables  could  change  stochastically  over time.  There is 
no reason not to use all the observations to date in making the estimate 
that is crucial for this procedure,  the variance of the regression coeffi- 
cient's  stochastic  process  relative to that of the regression  itself.  This 
is done in the lower panel. As econometric observers in 1996, we have 
no interest in what the upper panel tells us, namely, how we might have 
done the estimation if we were confined to observations available years 
ago. 
Things would be different for a different kind of equation.  Suppose 
the model of Fed behavior included Fed estimates  of future macroeco- 
nomic variables,  notably,  prices and unemployment.  In the absence of 
direct observations  of these estimates-although  projections by mem- 
bers of  the FOMC appear in the Fed's  twice-yearly  Monetary Policy 
Report to the Congress-one  could estimate  such expectations  by fil- 
tered estimates of the coefficients  of relevant macroeconomic equations, 
using observations  available up to each successive  date. The time series 
of  those  estimates  of  expectations  could  then be used  as explanatory 
variables  in equations  for  policy  responses  by the  Fed,  estimated 
on observations  for the entire period.  Friedman and Kuttner have  no 
forward-looking  variables  in their Fed policy  response equations,  and 
thus no  need  for  "filtered"  results  like  those  of  the upper panels  of 
figures  1 and 2. 
In figures 3-6,  the authors report VARs that are designed to measure 
how informative Fed policymakers  could have regarded MI and M2 to 
have been at past dates.  Presumably filtered estimates  of VAR coeffi- 
cients could have been used in those calculations,  but they were not. 
The Predictive  Content of Monetary Aggregates.  The authors then 
embark on a hazardous course.  They seek to evaluate the power of MI 
and M2  to predict inflation and real GDP.  Friedman and Kuttner are 
cautious in interpreting their VARs, but unwary readers may easily read 
too  much into them.  That is,  they  may interpret the significant  VAR 
relationships  in figures 3 and 4 as causal,  whereas the authors intend 
them  only  to  provide  information.  A  significant  relationship  means 
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hand,  and prices  and unemployment,  on the other,  but the effects  on 
money are observable  sooner.  Maybe so,  although a chronological  se- 
quence  of  money-then-prices  or money-then-output  could  reflect  re- 
verse causation.  An output shock that was unrelated to monetary policy 
could  result in temporally  precedent increases  in bank assets  and de- 
posits.  Or an observed change in M could result simply from reshuffling 
financial assets  between  banks and the public,  and have nothing to do 
with monetary policy  or macroeconomic  goals. 
The  role  of  M's  in  monetary  policy  has  always  been  a source  of 
ambiguity and confusion.  Are they links in the transmission chain? Or, 
are they simply informative precursors of the important macroeconomic 
variables? Surely the monetarists of the 1  960s and 1  970s had the former 
in mind. M was the supply of money-just  which M, Milton Friedman 
and his cohorts were not sure. The determination of that M was mon- 
etary policy;  in the language  of  1996 politics,  it was  what monetary 
policy  was  "all  about."  If,  however,  the function  of M was taken to 
be merely  informative,  then its character as "money"  was irrelevant, 
and it had to  compete  with  a host  of  other leading  indicators-non- 
monetary statistics  such as housing  starts, car sales,  consumer confi- 
dence,  new orders, and investment plans. In those ancient times,  Ben- 
jamin Friedman himself was in the forefront of challengers of the causal 
and informational importance of monetary aggregates. 
I do  not understand the  logic  of  the orthogonalization  of  the four 
variables in the VARs of figures 3 and 5; in order, real GDP, price, MI 
or M2,  and the federal funds rate. Should not the last two be reversed, 
so that intermediate money  supplies do not receive  credit for explana- 
tory results due to monetary policy  (r) itself? 
Anyway,  I am puzzled  by the spikes for the periods of oil shocks in 
figures 3 and 5.  Why  should M appear to account for so much of the 
output and price  variance  in those  particular years? This  is  the most 
dramatic instance of a more general puzzle,  namely,  why the replace- 
ment of a small number of observations,  as one moves from the sample 
ending  in one terminal year to the largely overlapping  sample ending 
in the next year,  makes such a big difference  in the percentage of the 
variance of output and prices that is explained  in figures 3 and 5,  and 
in the significance  of MI predictions of the GDP deflator that is shown 
in figure 4. (This seeming anomaly does not appear in the M2 alternative 
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Why Money  Lost  Predictive  Power.  The  conventional  version  of 
monetary history is that intermediate monetary targets were good guides 
to policy  until technological,  institutional,  and regulatory changes un- 
dermined  the  relationships  of  the  M's  to  output,  employment,  and 
prices.  In my  opinion,  the nostalgia  is overdone.  It was  always  true 
that the  sovereignty  of  any  of  the  M's  was  impaired by  their  very 
multiplicity,  and by  the  availability  of  near-monies  and other close 
substitutes.  Nor  should  it be  forgotten  that the  monetarists  assumed 
constant velocity,  denying or ignoring the interest elasticity  of demand 
for money. 
Incidentally,  in listing  the sources of the changes  in,  and increased 
unpredictability  of,  money  demand,  more  weight  should  be  put on 
legalization  of  payment of  market interest rates on deposits,  even  on 
checkable deposits.  This brought a one-time increase in money demand, 
and made the demand less elastic with respect to market interest rates. It 
also gave  depositors less  reason for concern about whether they should 
hold  deposits  or alternative short-term liquid assets; as  a result,  their 
balances can fluctuate considerably before they bother to reallocate them. 
Friedman and Kuttner subscribe to the conventional  view,  but they 
conscientiously  consider  it as one  of  three hypotheses  regarding the 
erosion  of  money's  predictive  power.  Hypothesis  1 is that the FOMC 
has successfully  fine-tuned money growth so as to stabilize output and 
prices,  leaving  no variance in them to be explained.  (They dismiss  out 
of hand, as clearly counterfactual,  the stronger Panglossian hypothesis 
0, that this success  would be achieved by eliminating  all variance from 
M itself.)  Hypothesis  2 is the conventional  view,  that money  demand 
has become  so  unstable  that fluctuations  in M's  no longer  anticipate 
output and prices.  And hypothesis  3 is that monetary policy  itself  has 
become  ineffectual. 
The Semistructural  VAR  Model. Friedman and Kuttner conclude that 
a  seinistructural  approach  is  needed  to  distinguish  among  the  three 
contesting  hypotheses  and to resolve  other questions regarding macro- 
economic  shocks  and their effects.  The four-variable  structural VAR 
system  that they adopt is just identified,  by assuming that no demand- 
side disturbances affect real output in the long run, that monetary dis- 
turbances  have  no  contemporaneous  effects  on real output,  and that 
demand for real money balances depends on output and the real interest 
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This  model  enables  the authors to distinguish  among  four innova- 
tions:  aggregate  demand  shocks  to first differences  in log  real GDP, 
supply  shocks  to  price  differences,  money  demand shocks  to  MI  or 
M2,  and monetary policy  shocks to the federal funds rate (r). 
Figures 9 and 10 display time series of the standard deviations of the 
four  shocks,  as  they  would  have  been  estimated  by  samples  of  one 
hundred observations  ending  at each date.  Again,  it is hard to under- 
stand how  big quick changes  can occur from one  sample to the next, 
largely  overlapping,  sample.  The sharp rise in the standard deviation 
of the IS shock in 1980 appears to be idiosyncratic,  reflecting the Carter 
credit controls  of that year.  The authors take comfort from figure  11, 
which shows that since  1981, the variability of money demand has risen 
relative to that of IS shocks,  even though this rise has simply restored 
the relative volatility  of the two shocks in the early  1970s.  (Recall that 
Friedman and Kuttner alleged  that money  demand was  very well  be- 
haved,  back then.) 
In the end, the authors are not able to use their semistructural model 
to analyze the consequences  of the proposed congressional  mandate to 
stabilize  prices.  The preoccupation  of the paper with obsolescent  M's 
is  mostly  beside  the point.  The relative  absence  of  supply  shocks  to 
prices and productivity after 1980 might suggest that the rule would be 
innocuous  in terms of lost output. It would have been helpful if Fried- 
man and Kuttner, on the basis of semistructural VARs estimated from 
all the observations  available  up to this date, had reported and plotted 
time series of all the shocks and their "effects"  on subsequent inflation 
and output. 
The useful  data base  of  macroeconomic  variables  as policymakers 
read them could be used in further research. It could be supplemented 
by other data on  what FOMC members  knew  or thought they  knew: 
their personal  projections  of  the economy,  or forecasts  of  the  Fed's 
macroeconometric  model.  Did deviations  from expectations  held when 
previous  policy  decisions  were  made  bring about subsequent  policy 
responses? Other extensions  of the data and methodology  of this paper 
might investigate  the policy  responses,  if any, to exchange rates and to 
fiscal developments. 
General  discussion:  The discussion  centered on inflation targeting and 
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noted that the paper's analysis of monetary targeting had little relevance 
for  inflation  targeting,  since  the  latter is  a  goal  and the  former  an 
instrument. He reported that the two main arguments made by Wash- 
ington proponents of inflation-only  targeting were,  first, that with only 
one instrument the Fed can pursue only one objective,  and second,  that 
money  is  neutral with  respect  to real activity  over  any relevant  time 
horizon.  Although  he dismissed  these  arguments and was opposed  to 
making inflation the sole  objective  of  monetary policy,  he welcomed 
the trend toward goal-oriented,  rather than instrument-oriented, targets 
because  goal  orientation  makes  central banks more  accountable.  He 
noted that the current reporting requirements under Humphrey-Hawkins 
do  little  to  hold  the  Federal  Reserve  responsible  for  its  actions  and 
reasoned  that an inflation  target together  with an output stabilization 
mandate would greatly increase the Fed's  accountability. 
The discussion  of inflation targeting revisited  arguments prominent 
in the debate over  rules versus discretion  in the conduct of  monetary 
policy.  Robert Hall advocated  caution in adopting rules and targets in 
general,  reminding  participants that a price  stabilization  policy  may 
cause  severe  disruption  to  the  economy  when  adverse  price  shocks 
occur.  He observed  that rules offer  a remedy for the inflationary bias 
in discretionary  monetary policy  that would result from time inconsis- 
tency,  also known as on-the-spot rationality. But he noted that they can 
also impose large costs,  under some circumstances.  Even in the absence 
of explicit  price stability targets, the Federal Reserve engineered reces- 
sions  during the oil  shocks  of  the  1970s  in order to reduce inflation, 
and, Hall reasoned,  the recessions  would have been much more severe 
if  there  had been  legislation  requiring price  stability.  He  added that 
similar dangers are inherent in nominal GDP targeting or Taylor-type 
rules.  Hall concluded  that the Rogoff  strategy of  appointing a central 
banker  whose  own  preferences,  relative  to  society's,  place  greater 
weight  on inflation  stabilization  and less  on employment  stabilization 
offers the best approach to dealing with the inflationary bias of discre- 
tionary monetary policy.  And he noted that conservative  central bank- 
ers, such as Alan Greenspan, have successfully  maintained low inflation 
over the last decade  in the absence of explicit  rules. 
Mark Gertler agreed that U.S.  experience  over the  1980s and 1990s 
is consistent  with the Rogoff  model because both Alan Greenspan and 
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However,  he questioned  whether Germany's  experience  supports the 
model.  Although the Bundesbank had already built a strong reputation 
as an inflation fighter, in 1980 disinflations produced two painful reces- 
sions  in Germany.  Gertler added that for the time inconsistency  story 
to  mean much  in the case  of  the United  States,  there would  have  to 
have been a significant and identifiable gap between the natural unem- 
ployment rate and its socially  optimal counterpart. In practice, the Fed 
seems  to  have  little  idea  of  what  the  national  rate is,  let  alone  the 
socially  optimal rate. 
James Duesenberry argued that the Fed, and consequently the Rogoff 
strategy, might be receiving  too much credit for the low inflation during 
the past decade.  He  reminded the Panel that the recent low  inflation 
rates have been  due,  in part, to the fortuitous absence  of  supply-side 
price  shocks  since  the  early  1980s.  He  reasoned  that the  persistent 
preoccupation  with inflation among developed  countries can be traced 
back to the  1970s,  when  a succession  of  supply-side  price shocks  led 
to inflation phobia.  This contrasts with the unemployment  phobia that 
existed  before  the  1970s  as an overhang  from the Great Depression. 
Duesenberry concluded  that policymakers  are repeatedly fighting wars 
that are long  over,  and considered  this a strong argument against  an 
inflation-only  rule for the Federal Reserve. 
Gregory Mankiw remarked that while there is a strong presumption 
of an inflation bias under discretionary monetary policy  in a one-shot 
game environment,  it is more realistic  to think of the Federal Reserve 
as facing  a repeated game,  in which case arguments built around time 
inconsistency  are more complicated.  In particular, multiple equilibria 
are likely  in a repeated game  environment.  The United States is cur- 
rently at a good  reputation equilibrium,  but there is no guarantee that 
it will remain so.  Consequently,  he regarded the case in favor of rules 
as quite strong, despite the recent favorable experience  without a rule. 
In response to questions  raised by James Tobin,  Friedman reported 
on experiments  with a version  of the Taylor rule whereby the federal 
funds rate responds only when the money aggregate moves outside the 
growth  cone,  rather than responding  continuously  as  money  growth 
deviates from the midpoint of the cone,  as in standard specifications  of 
the  Taylor  rule.  He  reported that estimation  results  did  not  change 
substantially from those reported in the paper. 144  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
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